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PREGLIMONY 
Shari Motro* 
Unmarried lovers who conceive are strangers in the eyes of the law. If the 
woman terminates the pregnancy, the man owes her nothing. If she takes the 
pregnancy to term, the man's obligation to support her is limited The law reflects 
this lovers-as-strangers presumption by making a man 's obligation towards a 
woman with whom he conceives derivative of his paternity-related obligations; 
his duty is towards his child, not towards the woman in her own right. Thus, a 
pregnant woman 's lost wages and other personal costs are her private problem, 
and if there is no child at the end of the pregnancy, there is no one----from a legal 
perspective-that the man must support. 
The law also endorses this lovers-as-strangers default in the w<ry in which it 
treats men who do support their pregnant lovers. It does this through the tax 
code. Current tax law likely regards ptryments between unmarried lovers as gifts 
or as child support. This characterization not only misses the mark descriptively, 
it also misses an opportunity to reward and encourage a behavior that is critical-
ly important in an age when sex and procreation outside of marriage are com-
mon. 
This Article argues that the law should develop a new framework for ad-
dressing the unique relationship between unmarried lovers who conceive and 
that tax reform offers a practical and relatively modest first step for doing so. To 
this end, it proposes that Congress create a pregnancy-support deduction to ben-
efit taxptryers who already support pregnant women, thereby extending to them 
the same deduction we now give taxptryers who ptry alimony. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We have alimony. We have palimony. Why don't we have preglimony? 
Under current law, a man has no legal obligation towards a woman with 
whom he conceives until paternity is established. This almost always happens 
after and only if a pregnancy is taken to full term. If the pregnancy ends in 
abortion, the woman is entirely on her own. If she gives birth, the man may be 
required to reimburse her for a portion of prenatal and birthing medical ex-
penses, but other pregnancy-related costs-like her lost wages-are seen as her 
personal problem. In many cases, women never invoke even these limited re-
troactive entitlements for fear of alienating men already reluctant to meet their 
child support obligations. 
Why is this a problem? First, unless both parties understood their encounter 
as a no-strings-attached proposition, the current rule is unfair. It puts a dispro-
portionate share of the costs of both parties' actions on the woman alone. 
Second, it gives men who assume their partner will terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy no economic incentive to be vigilant about birth control. Of course, 
conscientious men have plenty of other reasons to prevent an unwant~d preg-
nancy, but the fact that abortion is free for men leaves some unconcerned about 
pregnancy prevention, contributing to the perception that birth control is a 
woman's responsibility.' Finally, the current paradigm disregards the relational 
implications of conception. Some pregnancies result from what is clearly a no-
strings-attached encounter, but often the sex2 that produces a pregnancy takes 
I. See Jennifer A. Reich & Claire D. Brindis, Conceiving Risk and Responsibility: A 
Qualitative Examination of Men's Experiences of Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion, 5 
Im'LJ. MEN's HEALTH 133, 140 (2006) (noting that in a study of men whose sexual partners 
had undergone an abortion, the majority stated that "pregnancy prevention is the primary 
responsibility of women"). 
2. Since the focus of this Article is on pregnancy, "sex" or "sexual relations" general-
ly refers to penile-vaginal penetration. There are, of course, many other types of sex. Susan 
Appleton has argued that the legal and cultural focus on heterosexual intercourse to the ex-
clusion of other types of physical intimacy reflects a deep-seated disregard for women's 
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place in the context of a relationship in which certain baseline responsibilities 
are assumed. Data on men's involvement in pregnancy and abortion is scant,3 
but it does suggest that many abortions and most births take place in the context 
of relationships that involve some expectation of care and support.4 
Current scholarship on the legal relationship between unmarried lovers 
who conceive is virtually nonexistent,5 judicial commentary on the scope of 
unwed fathers' pregnancy-related obligations is sparse, and many state courts 
have been silent on the issue. Uncertainty abounds, leaving unmarried lovers 
who conceive to muddle through on their own. In the past, when marriage was 
the primary site for procreation, the problem was relatively modest. Today, 
with over one-third ofbirths6 and two-thirds of abortions7 occurring outside of 
marriage, the status quo is untenable. 
In a prior work-The Price of Pleasure8-I argued that the lovers-as-
strangers paradigm that now governs out-of-wedlock pregnancy should be re-
placed with a relational default. This default would require unmarried lovers 
who conceive to share both the direct and indirect financial burdens of the 
pleasure. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a "Culturally Cliterate" Family Law?, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 285-86 (2008). 
3. See infra note 34. 
4. See infra note 35. 
5. A number of scholars have begun to critique the law's hands-off approach to sex-
ual fraud. But these scholars do not focus on pregnancy in particular and they are uncon-
cerned with consensual sex that involves no fraud or deceit. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, 
Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 830-35 (1988) 
(arguing that criminal law is not "at a point where deception is generally regarded as an im-
permissible inducement to sex"); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call 
My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 
381 (1993) (arguing that the existing adjudicatory system is capable of"identify[ing] the ab-
sence of authentic consent required under [a] theory of sexual fraud"); Michelle Oberman, 
Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARiz. L. REv. 871, 889 (2005) ("The post-seduction 
norm of nondisclosure [that enables sexual fraud] represents a degree of complacency with 
regard to bald-faced lying that is almost unparalleled in the common law governing tort and 
contract."); Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REv. 817, 892-93 
(1996) (exploring the history of seduction under the law and treatment of sexual fraud under 
the Field Codes). 
The work of Linda Hirshman and Jane Larson does address the imbalance at the heart 
of the default code governing consensual heterosexual sex, but Hirshman and Larson do not 
focus on conception. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE 
POLITICS OF SEX 281 (1998). 
6. FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN 
IN BRIEF 4 (2008); see also Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John 
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 51, 86 
(20 1 0) ("In 2007, the number of children in the United States born out of wedlock exceeded 
I. 7 million, more than nineteen times the estimated number of children born out of wedlock 
in 1940."). 
7. An Overview of Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/presskits/2005/06/28/abortionoverview.htrnl (last visited 
Oct. 26, 20 1 0). 
8. Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 917 (2010). 
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pregnancy regardless of its outcome. It would not apply to pregnancies result-
ing from nonconsensual sex (including sex involving fraud or deceit) for which 
we have (albeit imperfect) criminal and tort frameworks, and couples who 
don't want to be governed by the relational paradigm would be free to opt out 
of it. No-strings-attached sex isn't inherently wrong; it's just the wrong legal 
default. 
I continue to maintain that comprehensive reform along these lines 
represents an important long-term ideal, but I also recognize that imposing a 
mandatory pregnancy-support obligation on unmarried men presents both ad-
ministrative and philosophical challenges that require further study. In this Ar-
ticle, therefore, I develop a simpler, more immediately practical framework 
through which we may begin to recognize the unique relationship between un-
married lovers who conceive: tax reform. 
The law is silent on the proper tax treatment of pregnancy-related pay-
ments, but current principles suggest that they may be either gifts or child sup-
port for tax purposes. Neither of these characterizations matches the realities of 
the relationship between lovers who conceive, and neither triggers tax conse-
quences because gifts and child support are nondeductible to the payor 
and excludible by the recipient. As a result, the current rule misses an opportu-
nity to reward and encourage men who are already inclined to support their 
pregnant lovers. In addition, it implicitly endorses a view of lovers as legal 
strangers. 
This Article proposes that Congress create a pregnancy-support deduc-
tion-a provision that would extend to taxpayers who support pregnant women 
the same benefits we now give taxpayers who pay alimony. Part I lays out the 
problem-when unmarried sexual partners conceive they often view the preg-
nancy as a shared responsibility, but the law treats them as strangers. As a re-
sult, the current legal approach to reproduction is unjust, it is expressly harm-
ful, and it sets up the wrong incentives. Part II explores possibilities for 
reform-bolstering marriage as the gateway to sex, increasing public support 
for pregnant women, and giving women a legally enforceable entitlement to 
support from the men with whom they conceive. Ultimately, I conclude that 
these possibilities are unworkable, utopian, or unlikely to materialize in the 
near term. Part III therefore turns to the pregnancy-support deduction-a rela-
tively simple amendment to the Internal Revenue Code with immediate effects. 
The deduction would incentivize greater pregnancy-related support and treat 
unmarried lovers more equitably by implicitly recognizing that they are neither 
spouses nor complete strangers, but rather something in between. 
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I. THE LOVERS-AS-STRANGERS PARADIGM 
A. The Current Law of Conception 
Our legal tradition has not been kind to unmarried love. Under the common 
law, men had no legal obligations towards the women with whom they con-
ceived out ofwedlock.9 Today, the same rule holds in cases in which the wom-
an terminates an unintended pregnancy-the man owes her nothing. When the 
woman takes the pregnancy to term, most states require unwed fathers to par-
ticipate in the "reasonable expenses" of pregnancy, 10 which are generally li-
mited to expenses that directly benefit the subsequently born child. This is be-
cause most states frame pregnancy-related obligations as an element of a man's 
child support obligations11 or as part of a parentage order, 12 not as a duty to-
wards the woman in her own right. The rationale behind this approach stems 
from the now widely accepted imperative that children of unmarried parents 
should not be relegated to the legal no-man's-land of"illegitimacy."13 All fifty 
states now require both parents to support their offspring regardless of marital 
status.14 Since a child's prebirth health cannot be disentangled from the health 
9. See People ex rei. Lawton v. Snell, 111 N.E. 50, 51 (N.Y. 1916); In re Cirillo's Es-
tate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (Sur. Ct. 1952); Jelen v. Price, 458 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1983). 
10. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CoDE§ 7637 (West 2010) (an unwed father may be directed 
"to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confmement"); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 15-8-1 (2010) ("The father of a child which is or may be born out oflawful wedlock 
is liable to the same extent as the father of a child born in lawful wedlock ... for the reason-
able expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement .... "); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-49.8(A) (2010) ("A judgment or order establishing parentage .... may direct either 
party to pay the reasonable and necessary unpaid expenses of the mother's pregnancy and 
delivery or equitably apportion the unpaid expenses between the parties."); State ex rei. Rei-
tenour, 807 A.2d 1259, 1262 (N.H. 2002) (relying on N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:1 
(2002) in holding that "[ o ]nee paternity has been established, the father of a child born out of 
wedlock is liable for the 'reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement"'). 
II. See, e.g., 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 45/14 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 209C, § 9 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-7 (2010). 
12. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7637; CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 19-4-116(3)(a) (2010); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-49.8(A). 
13. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION§ 3.01, at 464 
(2002) ("[I]t is now generally accepted that children of informal and formal relationships 
must be treated equally with respect to the amount and duration of child support."). 
14. See Jeffery W. Santema, Annotation, Liability of Father for Retroactive Child 
Support on Judicial Determination of Paternity, 87 A.L.R. 5th 361, 379-80 (2001) ("The 
parents of a child born out of wedlock have an obligation to support the child .... It is the 
fact of paternity or maternity, not that of marriage, that obligates the parents to nourish and 
rear the child. Hence, the support rights of children born out of wedlock are the same as 
those of children born in wedlock."). 
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of the expectant mother, child support begins in utero. 15 Accordingly, most 
cases dealing with the scope of these pregnancy-related obligations focus on 
prenatal and birthing medical expenses, 16 as does the Uniform Parentage Act, 
which provides that: 
Copies of bills for genetic testing and for prenatal and postnatal health care 
for the mother and child which are furnished to the adverse party [to a paterni-
ty proceeding] not less than 10 days before the date of a hearing are admissi-
ble to establish: 
17 
... that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary. 
Case law generally disregards other costs like lost wages, 18 childbirth classes, 19 
and maternity clothes. 20 
15. See Coxwell v. Matthews, 435 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Ga. 1993) ("[T]he duty to protect 
and maintain a child includes the duty to ensure that the child receives adequate medical care 
prior to and during birth."). 
16. See, e.g., id. at 34 (holding that a claim for $15,459 in pregnancy- and birth-related 
medical expenses may be made in an action to determine the paternity of a child and affirm-
ing the trial court's order that the father reimburse the mother for the entire amount); Sisne-
roz v. Polanco, 975 P.2d 392, 398-99 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the mother of a 
child born out of wedlock had standing to seek reimbursement for pregnancy and birthing 
expenses while recognizing the trial court's discretion to grant or deny pregnancy and birth-
ing costs); State ex rei. Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Carpenter, 564 S.E.2d 173, 176 
(W. Va. 2002) (requiring a biological father to reimburse the Department of Health and Hu-
man Resources for $4,879 in birth and medical expenses paid on behalf of the mother); Ka-
thy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 371 S.E.2d 583, 587 (W. Va. 1988) (requiring a child's biological 
father to reimburse the mother for birth expenses); see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 209C, § 9(a) ("An order may be entered requiring a parent chargeable with support to 
reimburse the mother ... for medical expenses attributable to the child or associated with 
childbirth or resulting from the pregnancy."); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-20-48 (2010) (adopting 
language from section 62l(d) of Uniform Parentage Act); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-621 
(2010) (adopting same section 621(d) language); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.621 (West 
2010) (also adopting section 62l(d) language); id. § 160.636(g) ("On a finding of parentage, 
the court may ... on a proper showing, order a party to pay an equitable portion of all of the 
prenatal and postnatal health care expenses of the mother and the child."); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-15-613 (LexisNexis 201 0) (adopting language from section 621 (d) of Uniform Paren-
tage Act); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 26.26.570 (West 2010) (adopting same section 62l(d) 
language); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2-813 (2010) (adopting same section 62l(d) language). 
17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 62l(d) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 346 (2001 & Supp. 
2008). 
18. Many jurisdictions have been silent on the issue, but Minnesota, Montana, and 
Ohio have construed the Uniform Parentage Act not to include lost wages as part of the rea-
sonable expenses associated with the birth. See Bunge v. Zachman, 578 N.W.2d 387, 389 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998); In re Paternity ofW.L., 855 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Mont. 1993); Jelen v. 
Price, 458 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). But see Homer v. Dible, No. S-93-44, 
1994 WL 319071, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1994) (affirming the trial court's award of 
lost wages under new statutory language). Lost wages are also not included in reasonable 
expenses of pregnancy in Arkansas. See Taylor v. Finck, 211 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ark. 2005). 
19. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 929 (Pa. 1986) (construing the "rea-
sonable lying-in expenses" language to mean that Lamaze classes, prenatal care, and sono-
grams are not chargeable to the adopting parents to reimburse for expenses on behalf of the 
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B. The Problem with the Status Quo 
This legal status quo is troubling for three main reasons. First, it is unfair. 
When a woman who isn't prepared to be a mother discovers she's pregnant, the 
weeks and months that follow can be extremely difficult. If she chooses to ter-
minate the pregnancy, the physical and emotional risks of the procedure alone 
are significant.21 When an abortion causes an infection, the long-term effects 
may be serious, even fatal.22 For many women, an abortion is also logistically 
and financially hard to obtain.23 
natural mother). The court in Taylor relied on this holding to deny reimbursement to a birth 
mother for such expenses from the birth father. 211 S.W.3d at 537. 
20. See, e.g., Taylor, 211 S.W.3d at 537 ("Lying-in expenses normally would not in-
clude items such as maternity clothes, lost wages, or counseling."). A minority of states ex-
tend a man's pregnancy-related obligations beyond the narrow scope guided by the best in-
terests of the child to encompass duties to the woman in her own right. Most notably, 
Delaware's domestic relations statute dedicates an independent code section to the "[d]uty to 
support woman with child conceived out of wedlock." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 504 (2010). 
This provision empowers judges to allocate the costs of pregnancy and birth as they see fit. 
Despite this broad statutory language, however, there is little indication that Delaware courts 
have awarded pregnant women anything in excess of the amount typically available in other 
states under the child support rubric: reimbursement for medical expenses directly related to 
pregnancy and childbirth. See DCSE/J. O'C. v. D.U., No. CN07-03863, 2009 WL 1205835, 
at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 18, 2009) (discussing only out-of-pocket delivery expenses in con-
nection with a man's pregnancy-related obligation). 
21. These include abdominal cramping, irregular bleeding, nausea, vomiting, and di-
arrhea. See ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN'S HEALTH AFTER ABORTION 
2-3 (2002); Abortion-Before, During, and After an Abortion: When to Call a Doctor, 
WEBMD, http://women.webmd.com/tc/abortion-before-during-and-after-an-abortion-when 
-to-call-a-doctor (last updated Sept. 29, 2008); Possible Physical Side Affects [sic], AM. 
PREGNANCY Ass 'N, http://www .americanpregnancy .org/unp1annedpregnancy /possib1eside 
effects.html (last updated Sept. 2007). On the psychological effects of abortion and debates 
surrounding the extent and relevance of these effects, see Reva B. Siegel, Lecture, The 
Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion 
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008); Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and 
Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (2010); and Emotional Reactions 
After an Abortion, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/hw-popup/emotional-reactions-after 
-an-abortion (last updated Sept. 29, 2008). 
22. See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 247 (22d ed. 2005) ("Al-
though serious complications of abortion most often occur with criminal abortion, even 
spontaneous abortion and legal elective abortion continue to be associated with severe and 
even fatal infections. Severe hemorrhage, sepsis, bacterial shock, and acute renal failure have 
all developed in association with abortion but at a much lower frequency. Uterine infection 
is the usual outcome, but parametritis, peritonitis, endocarditis, and septicemia may all oc-
cur." (citations omitted)); RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 21, at 2; Joel Brind et al., 
Induced Abortion as an Independent Risk Factor for Breast Cancer, 50 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & 
COMMUNITY HEALTH 481 (1996); David A. Grimes, Sequelae of Abortion, in MODERN 
METHODS OF INDUCING ABORTION95, 101-02 (David T. Baird et al. eds., 1995). 
23. Most U.S. counties do not have abortion providers. This means that women must 
travel, sometimes for hours, to the nearest clinic. Once they arrive, an abortion typically 
costs several hundred dollars, and public funding for abortions is limited. As a result of their 
difficulties reaching a clinic and raising the money for the procedure, pregnant women who 
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As for a pregnancy taken to term, the consequences go far beyond the 
monetary charges of visits to the obstetrician/gynecologist and the delivery 
room. Pregnancy may of course be an inspiring and joyful experience, but even 
smooth pregnancies come with routine difficulties that are more extensive than 
is generally recognized-including prolonged bouts of nausea and vomiting, 
back pain, and fatigue.24 Pregnancy also limits a woman's freedom of move-
ment and it transforms her public identity. Reva Siegel captures some of the ef-
fects of pregnancy on a woman's personhood: 
A woman may find that pregnancy comes to embody her social identity to 
others, who may treat her with love and respect or, alternatively, abuse her as 
a burden, scorn her as unwed, or judge her as unfit for employ-
ment. ... Pregnancy, and the period of lactation that follows it, are not merely 
burdensome, disruptive, or even consuming forms of work. They amplify the 
gendered judgments and constraints to which women are already subject, ex-
posing them to material and dignitary injuries having nothing to do with the 
physiology of reproduction, and entangling them in relationships that pro-
foundly define their identity and life prospects.25 
After childbirth, a woman may require weeks, sometimes months to recover, 
especially if she is among the one-third of mothers who now give birth through 
a cesarean-which is major abdominal surgery.26 Possible complications and 
long-term risks of pregnancy and childbirth include chronic vaginal and bowel 
infections, incontinence, and diabetes. All of these effects compounded togeth-
are both poor and young are more likely to undergo later-term-and therefore riskier-
abortions. See The New Health Care Reform Legislation: Pros and Cons for Reproductive 
Health, GUITMACHER lNST. (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/ 
201 0/03/29/index.html. 
24. I discuss these effects in further detail in The Price of Pleasure. See Motro, supra 
note 8, at 923-24. 
25. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Reg-
ulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 374-75 (1992) (footnotes 
omitted); see also ANNIE MURPHY PAUL, ORIGINS: HOW THE NINE MONTHS BEFORE BIRTH 
SHAPE THE REST OF OUR LIVES 167 (2010) ("We're used to thinking of adolescence as a time 
when our bodies are changing, when our emotions are unruly-well, pregnancy is very simi-
lar .... It's a very disorderly time, when a lot of things are in flux. But that fluidity also 
opens up new opportunities for positive change .... You have to let yourself fall apart, and 
then put the pieces back together in a different way." (quoting therapist Catherine Monk)). 
26. See Cesarean Section-Topic Overview, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/baby/ 
tc/cesarean-section-topic-overview (last updated Feb. 24, 2010) ("[I]t may take 4 weeks or 
longer to fully recover [after a C-section]. "). On recovery of the perineal area in particular, 
see Frederick R. Jelovsek, Vaginal Conditions After Delivery, WoMEN'S HEALTH RESOURCE, 
http://www.wdxcyber.com/npreg14.htm (last visited June 6, 2010) ("One study that looked 
at how long, on the average, it took women to recover various functions after normal vaginal 
delivery found that the median time (time for 50% of subjects) 'for perineal comfort in gen-
eral (including walking and sitting) was 1 month (range, 0-6 months); 20% of women took 
more than 2 months to achieve general perineal comfort. For comfort during sexual inter-
course, the median time was 3 months (range, 1 to more than 12 months); 20% of women 
took longer than 6 months to achieve comfort during sexual intercourse."' (emphasis omit-
ted)). 
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er tend to interfere with a woman's ability to provide for herself, if only tempo-
rarily, and the scope of workplace protections for pregnant women is limited. 
As Joanna Grossman explains, 
[t]he plight of pregnant workers today rests ... primarily ... in the failure of 
current law to account for the physical, medical, and social realities of preg-
nancy. Pregnancy discrimination law provides absolute protection for women 
only if they retain full work capacity during the period of pregnancy and 
childbirth. A pregnant woman who seeks to continue working through preg-
nancy, but experiences a temporary diminishment or alteration of capacity due 
to the physical effects of pregnancy, will encounter limited protection in the 
law.27 
Annie Murphy Paul illustrates the disconnect between pregnant women's reali-
ty and their roles in society through what she calls the myth of the Pregnant 
Superwoman: 
This imaginary superhero never needs to sit down and take the weight off her 
feet, or catch her breath at the top of the stairs. She runs a marathon in her 
third trimester and works twelve-hour days until her water breaks. She's just 
like a nonpregnant mortal, in fact, only better, and she has become the unat-
tainable standard against which women measure themselves during pregnancy . 
. . . [The myth of the Pregnant Superwoman] is perpetuated in part by 
pregnant women themselves: she reassures us with her cheerful invulnerabili-
ty, her bulletproof resistance to all the changes-physical and emotional and 
logistical-that come along with having a child. Her fearless independence al-
lows us to evade the fact that pregnancy and childrearing do make us more 
dependent on others, in the heat of a disaster and in the heart of everyday life. 
In short, the Pregnant Superwoman embodies the insistence that pregnancy 
doesn't change anything, a fable that may hold as much appeal for pregnant 
women as it does for spouses and employers. She tells us that, for nine months 
more, we can hold off the tidal wave of change we know is coming-but at 
the cost of slighting the needs that have already arisen, and ignoring the 
changes that are already here.Z8 
27. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 
GEo. L.J. 567, 570 (2010); see also id. at 578 ("An important, yet under-examined, aspect of 
pregnant women in the modem workplace is the potential for conflict between the physical 
effects of pregnancy and paid work. ... Historically, women 'with child' were presumed 
incapable of work, particularly in the later stages of pregnancy .... Today, the opposite pre-
sumption is often applied-uncomplicated pregnancy has no meaningful physical effects that 
bear on a woman's ability to work. The presumption of incapacity and the presumption of 
uninterrupted capacity are, however, both flawed."). 
28. PAUL, supra note 25, at 59, 73-74; see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 955-56 (1984) ("The power to create people is awe-
some. Men are profoundly disadvantaged by the reality that only women can produce a hu-
man being and experience the growth of a child in pregnancy. Pregnancy and childbirth are 
also burdensome to health, mobility, independence, and sometimes to life itself, and women 
are profoundly disadvantaged in that they alone bear these burdens."). 
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These realities combined with our heavy reliance on the nuclear family as a 
form of "social insurance"29 mean that when the man is not forthcoming and 
the pregnancy is complicated (both physically and in its impact on a woman's 
work life), the law leaves a single pregnant woman to shoulder most of the bur-
dens alone. When a man goes beyond his legal call of duty and regards the 
pregnancy as a shared responsibility, the law casts his contributions as optional 
gifts, gratuitous acts of kindness, which leads some women to refuse the help 
they deserve out of pride.30 As we shall see, tax law reinforces this message. 
For sexual partners who do not already share their income but who nevertheless 
view pregnancy as a shared responsibility, the law also gives virtually no guid-
ance as to a reasonable or equitable baseline for pregnancy-related support. 
Partners must essentially make up their own rules as they go, which can put 
tremendous pressure on men and women alike. 
The second problem with the status quo is that it sets up the wrong incen-
tives. Studies show that adolescent men who expect to pay child support should 
their partner become pregnant have fewer partners, less frequent intercourse, 
and are more likely to use contraceptives. 31 But in some relationships, men as-
sume-sometimes reasonably-that a woman will terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy. How does the fact that abortion frees men not only of child support 
but also of any responsibility towards the woman figure into what happens in 
the bedroom? 
Decisions about sex, contraception, and abortion take place in the shadow 
of the law's allocation of their attendant risks. It is only logical that one way to 
reduce unintended pregnancies might be to raise the stakes for men, to make 
sure all pregnancies have concrete consequences for both parties involved. 
29. See Anne Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, HARV. L. & 
POL'YREV. 3 (2010). 
30. I have not found in-depth studies of support patterns among unmarried lovers, but 
the 1960 novel The L-Shaped Room provides one beautifully subtle rendering of the complex 
and layered emotions involved. See LYNNE REID BANKS, THE L-SHAPED RooM 240 (1960) 
("'What's your trouble, my lad?"' the heroine asks the stirring in her womb after meeting 
Terry, the man with whom she conceived, for the first time since their affair. '"Should I have 
taken the money he wanted to give us? Why not? you ask. A good question.' Well, why not? 
He hadn't offered it out of a sense of duty. Or had he? I didn't much care. What mattered 
was that I hadn't wanted it .... 'It would have given him some claim on you,' I said to the 
bump under my hand, 'and such claims can't be bought with money.' But I knew that wasn't 
the only reason. I looked at the stove, snarling like the part of me that had wanted Terry to 
see all this-the five long flights, the darkness, the smell, the landing taps; I had wanted to 
punish him. But that feeling had gone-so quickly. I drew back my lips and snapped my 
teeth happily at the stove. I felt pleased with myself. It would have been so easy to hate Ter-
ry, to take advantage of his vulnerable position; it would have been so easy to take the mon-
ey, and to justify taking it. I wasn't pleased because I'd resisted the temptation to take it. I 
was pleased because I hadn't wanted it."). 
31. See Chien-Chung Huang & Wen-Jui Han, Child Support Enforcement and Sexual 
Activity of Male Adolescents, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 763 (2007); Chien-Chung Huang & 
Wen-Jui Han, Perceptions of Child Support and Sexual Activity of Adolescent Males, 27 J. 
ADOLESCENCE 731 (2004). 
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Thus, increasing support for pregnant women regardless of the pregnancy's 
outcome is likely, over time, to change abortion from being used as a form of 
birth control that lets men off the hook into a last resort that both parties are in-
vested in preventing. It may also reduce abortions obtained under the pressure 
of short-term economic considerations. 32 
To be sure, responsible men don't need external incentives to do the right 
thing; they do their best to prevent pregnancy, and when their efforts fail they 
don't leave their partner in the lurch, even when their legal duties are minimal 
or nil. But for some men, the bottom line matters. 
Third and finally, by viewing nonmarital pregnancies through the prism of 
paternity rather than as giving rise to an obligation toward the woman herself, 
the current rule not only underestimates the real costs of pregnancy, it also ig-
nores the relational implications of conception. True, not all conceptions hap-
pen in the context of an ongoing relationship, and casual lovers who mutually 
intend and expect a no-strings-attached encounter (i.e., those who expect to 
have no responsibilities vis-a-vis each other should pregnancy occur) should be 
permitted to set their own rules. But using the lovers-as-strangers paradigm as 
the baseline governing all nonmarital conceptions flies in the face of most 
people's reality. For one, most conceptions result not from birth control failures 
during a single encounter but from repeated acts of unprotected intercourse.33 
Also, though further research is needed,34 studies suggest that most unmarried 
fathers are involved to some extent during the birth of their child, and boy-
32. A recent study suggests that child support enforcement decreases the incidence of 
abortion. See Jocelyn Elise Crowley, Radha Jagannathan & Galo Falchettore, The Effect of 
Child Support Enforcement on Abortion in the United States 22-23 (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). For data on the higher incidence of abortion among poor wom-
en, see HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION IN WOMEN'S LIVES 20 
(2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/ AiWL.pdf ("The abortion 
rate among women living below the federal poverty level ... is more than four times that of 
women living above 300% of the poverty level .... "); and Annie Murphy Paul, Is the 
Recession Causing More Abortions?, SLATE (May 15, 2009), http://www.doublex.com/ 
section/health-science/recession-causing-more-abortions. 
33. See JENNIFER J. FROST, JACQUELINE E. DARROCH & LISA REMEZ, GUTIMACHER 
INST., IMPROVING CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at http:// 
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/05/09/lmprovingContraceptiveUse.pdf ("Slightly more than 
half of unintended pregnancies occur among women who were not using any method of con-
traception in the month they conceived, and more than four in 10 occur among women who 
used their method inconsistently or incorrectly. Only one in 20 are attributable to method 
failure."); EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO 
CONSENT 51-53 (1996). 
34. See ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK & GARY MCLOUTH, MEN AND ABORTION: LESSONS, 
LOSSES, AND LOVE 5 (1984) (finding that eight-five percent of sociological research on abor-
tion "dealt with women, or the fetus, or the state, etc.-anything except the men involved"); 
Reich & Brindis, supra note 1, at 134 ("Some research has been conducted regarding the 
perceptions of men's roles in contraception, reproduction, or pregnancy in general, but far 
less research has been conducted in the area of men's experiences with abortion." (citations 
omitted)). 
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friends commonly pay for or contribute to the cost of an abortion.35 Unless the 
sex was mutually understood as implying no ongoing responsibilities should 
conception occur, when the man abandons his pregnant lover we generally 
think he has done something wrong, that he has violated a basic moral code. 
Why then is a lovers-as-strangers paradigm our legal default? 
One way to make sense of the current rule is as an example of what Robin 
West sees as the hyperindividualistic starting point-the "separation thesis"-
that underlies modern American jurisprudence.36 We imagine ourselves as dis-
connected self-sufficient beings; we believe that we are essentially and funda-
mentally free-floating independent selves. Accordingly, we think that the great-
est danger we face is that other individuals will interfere with or violate our 
otherwise blissfully isolated independence. This "separation thesis" drives us to 
fortify ourselves with laws that preserve values like autonomy and privacy, 
while ignoring other values that are equally essential to human flourishing like 
intimacy and mutual responsibility.37 Human beings are social animals, we are 
35. One study of unmarried parents in Oakland, California, revealed that most unmar-
ried parents were romantically involved when their child was born and that about half were 
living together. SARAH MCLANAHAN ET AL., PuB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., FRAGILE FAMILIES 
ONE YEAR LATER: OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 7 (2002), available at http://www.ppic.org/ 
content/pubs/op/op _1 002smop.pdf. Approximately eighty percent of the mothers in the sur-
vey "reported that the father had contributed financial support or helped in other ways (such 
as providing transportation) during the pregnancy." /d. at I 0; see also MAUREEN R. WALLER, 
MY BABY'S FATHER: UNMARRIED PARENTS AND PATERNAL RESPONSIBILITY 2-3 (2002) ("Ap-
proximately 33 percent of all births in the United States now occur to unmarried par-
ents .... [and] about half of these parents are living together at the time of their child's 
birth."). Another survey of men in abortion clinic waiting rooms revealed that most paid for 
all or some of the procedure. See SHOSTAK & McLOUTH, supra note 34, at 36. Note, howev-
er, that data on how many men accompany their partner to the clinic are contradictory. Com-
pare Reich & Brindis, supra note I, at 135 ("One recent study found that only 22-25% of 
women came or left the abortion procedure with the man by whom they became pregnant." 
(citing Britta Beenhakker et al., Are Partners Available for Post-Abortion Contraceptive 
Counseling? A Pilot Study in a Baltimore City Clinic, 69 CONTRACEPTION 419 (2004))), with 
SHOSTAK & MCLOUTH, supra note 34, at 17 n.l (finding that men accompanied their partners 
to abortion clinics approximately half of the time). 
36. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. I, 2 (1988). 
37. West casts this opposition in gendered terms. In her view, the separation bias is in-
herently male, while connection is inherently female. Women, unlike men, "are not essen-
tially, necessarily, inevitably ... separate from other human beings .... [W]oman [sic] are 
'essentially connected' .... " !d. at 2-3. West locates women's essential connectedness in 
their "critical material experiences," including pregnancy and breastfeeding. !d. at 3; see also 
Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of 
Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 210 (2000). 
I do not know whether separation is essentially masculine or connection is essentially 
feminine, but I do believe that the ultimate conclusion West draws from these categories is 
crucial to the knot we are trying to unravel. Her most compelling insight is that connected-
ness expresses an important, undervalued truth that is critical to the happiness of both men 
and women. Though she emphasizes the differences between the sexes, West also thinks that 
both men and women are animated by both connection and separation. It is the tension be-
tween the two, she says, that is essential to our nature. See West, supra note 36, at 15-19. 
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all inescapably interdependent, we are mutually bound, and we need one anoth-
er. Thus, West argues that building and cultivating a "connection thesis" to 
counterbalance the prevailing separation bias is critical to creating a more hu-
mane jurisprudence. 
Applying this framework to our problem, pregnancy and the sexual act that 
precedes it are the ultimate embodiment of human beings' capacity for connec-
tedness. A system that treats a woman and the man with whom she conceives 
as legal strangers is profoundly out of touch with the emotional, spiritual, and 
moral dimensions of human experience. In some cases, this legal lacuna legiti-
mates the view that an unintended pregnancy is a woman's problem. In others, 
the law's failure to provide a script, a framework for couples to deal with a dif-
ficult situation that clearly implicates both parties, may contribute to the pres-
sure to marry when alternative forms would yield better long-term conse-
quences.38 Finally, by remaining silent on this issue, the law misses an oppor-
opportunity to sanction and encourage, indeed to normalize, pregnancy support 
within unmarried couples.39 
In sum, the lovers-as-strangers paradigm belongs in the past. It is out of 
step with broadly accepted mores regarding men's responsibility toward a lover 
undergoing an abortion, and its minimalist approach to pregnancies taken to 
term is unfair, unwise, and untrue to human experience. 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
In this Part, I tum from the problem to possible solutions. Ultimately, I 
conclude that the main existing framework for addressing the special relation-
ship between a man and a woman who conceive-marriage-is not a panacea. 
Nor are utopian proposals to do away with civil marriage and shift the burden 
of supporting reproduction from the private realm of the family to the state. A 
third possibility is to create a new legal status specifically designed to address 
the unique situation of unmarried lovers who conceive. This option is promis-
ing, but requires further development before it may be implemented. 
38. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
39. Supporting and encouraging pregnancy support should be especially popular 
among those dedicated to responsible fatherhood initiatives. See Senator Barack Obama, 
Remarks at the Apostolic Church of God (June 15, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/stateupdates/gG5nFK) ("We need fathers 
to realize that responsibility does not end at conception."); White House Launches Father-
hood Initiative, NPR (Aug. II, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyld= 111770004 ("Obama's faith-based office will go around the country holding town 
hall meetings to discuss the importance of fatherhood and speak with community organiza-
tions about what policies best work to build strong families."). 
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A. Marriage 
The legal vacuum in which unmarried lovers who conceive find themselves 
might be seen as a symptom of another, broader crisis: the crisis afflicting the 
institution of marriage. The very purpose of marriage, some believe, is to regu-
late the unique relational consequences of heterosexual reproduction.40 The 
most visible recent manifestation of this view has arisen in the context of the 
debates surrounding gay marriage. "[A ]n orderly society requires some me-
chanism for coping with the fact that sexual intercourse commonly results in 
pregnancy and childbirth," wrote dissenting Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court Justice Robert Cordy in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,41 
and "[t]he institution of marriage is that mechanism."42 According to this fre-
quently quoted argument,43 marriage should be limited to heterosexuals be-
cause the raison d'etre of marriage-regulating accidental procreation-is a 
nonissue for gay and lesbian lovers. 
Applying this theory of marriage to the problem, the most appropriate re-
sponse might be to bolster the tried-and-true institution we already have for ad-
dressing the issue rather than reinventing the wheel. From this perspective, 
marriage is women's insurance policy against being left in the lurch. Marriage 
guarantees a minimal level of mutual support, at least de jure.44 A pregnant 
woman married to the man with whom she conceives is thus marginally safer 
than a pregnant woman who is unwed. Women who want their relationship to 
be governed by a set of rules that depart from the no-strings-attached default 
are free to make their commitment official and legally binding. Indeed, some 
people believe that society deliberately provides additional incentives for them 
40. For a discussion and critique of the channeling function of marriage, see Appleton, 
supra note 2, at 276-85. 
41. 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 969 (ma-
jority opinion) (holding that a bar against same-sex marriage violated the state's constitu-
tion). 
42. Id. at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
43. See Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples 
and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3-4 (2009) (survey-
ing and critiquing the widespread influence of Justice Cordy's decision). 
44. Note however that economically dependent spouses generally have few mechan-
isms for enforcing their entitlements during marriage. Spouses' economic rights generally 
vest at divorce. For a discussion of spouses' limited economic rights during an ongoing mar-
riage, see Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in 
Ongoing Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 113 (2008-2009). See also 
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 
34 (1996) (explaining that spouses' duty of mutual support is "not directly enforceable be-
tween the parties when married" but "may be enforceable during a marriage only by third 
party creditors who may sue one spouse for certain very narrow categories of debts underta-
ken by the other"). Even at divorce, while property distribution determinations may take 
childcare contributions into account, they do not look at pregnancy and the "labor" of child-
birth for purposes of determining spouses' contributions to the marriage. 
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to do so--including sizable tax benefits45 -and that partners who choose not to 
commit deserve to face the consequences of their actions alone. From this pers-
pective, changing the default governing unmarried lovers to include minimal 
relational duties might further erode the fragile institution by removing one of 
the remaining imperatives to get married. 
The historical accuracy of the theory of marriage as primarily aimed at re-
gulating accidental reproduction is subject to debate.46 Its current relevance, 
however, is clearly dubious. The overwhelming majority of Americans today 
have sex outside of marriage.47 Even the abstinence movement within conserv-
45. Contrary to popular belief, Congress did not create the "marriage bonus" in order 
to promote marriage. Nevertheless, politicians and activists have grown to defend it as 
though Congress did. See Shari Motro, A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income 
Tax, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1509, 1529 (2006) [hereinafter Motro, A New "I Do'l For discussion 
of tax and other marriage-based benefits, see Appleton, supra note 2, at 273 ("By licensing 
marriage and attaching to it material and status-based benefits, the state singles out the fa-
vored, 'legitimate' site for sexual activity, and clearly communicates its preference for mo-
nogamy .... " (footnote omitted)); Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, The Costs of Being a 
Gay Couple Run Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at Al; and Shari Motro, Op-Ed., The 
State of the Unions; Single and Payingfor It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 4, at 15. 
46. In fact, as Kerry Abrams and Peter Brooks argue, rather than guaranteeing all 
pregnant women a minimal level of support, marriage limited men's responsibility to just 
one of their companions. "In the English legal tradition," they write, 
"[m]arriage ... functioned not as a check on the wildness of male heterosexuality but as a 
way for men to maintain sexual freedom without adverse financial consequences .... " Ab-
rams & Brooks, supra note 43, at 9. Marriage obviously provided no protections to mi-
stresses, prostitutes, or slaves. See Larson, supra note 5, at 389-90 ("[Victorian] conventions 
of female sexual modesty protected 'respectable' women only at the expense of prostitutes, 
enslaved women, and domestic servants, against whom male sexual interest was redi-
rected."); see also STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 35 (2005) ("The story that 
marriage was invented for the protection of women is still the most widespread myth about 
the origins of marriage."); id. at 31 ("Probably the single most important function of mar-
riage through most of history ... was its role in establishing cooperative relationships be-
tween families and communities."); id. at 34-49 (discussing the invention of marriage); 
NANCY F. COTI, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 16 (2000) ("As an 
intentional and harmonious juncture of individuals for mutual protection, economic advan-
tage, and common interest, the marriage bond resembled the social contract that produced 
government."). For a summary of judicial critiques of the theory, see Courtney Megan Ca-
hill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the Law's Procreationist 
Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 393, 410-12 (2007); and Law, supra note 28, at 
957-58. 
47. See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families 60 (George 
Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 343, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l008544 ("Social science 
research ... suggests that well over 90% of all adults engage in sex before they mar-
ry .... "). As Cahn and Carbone show, the main cultural divide in America today seems to 
be not between unmarried youth who abstain and those who are sexually active. Rather, the 
main division is in how people tend to handle an unplanned pregnancy. Conservatives tend 
toward the "shotgun wedding" while liberals are more likely to terminate the pregnancy. 
The unintended pregnancy rate is highest among young unmarried women. See Stanley 
K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 24, 27 
(1998); Melinda Beck, The Birth-Control Riddle, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 20,2010, at D1 ("One 
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ative Christian communities has delayed the age of first intercourse only mar-
ginally.48 Some studies show that teens who take chastity pledges are also less 
likely to use birth control, presumably because "the use of birth control implies 
that one thought about sex beforehand; one planned for it.'49 As the age of first 
intercourse falls and the age of first marriage rises, the real world relevance of 
marriage as gatekeeper becomes increasingly tenuous. 
Not only does marriage fail to deter nonmarital sex, the solution it offers 
young people who marry because of an accidental pregnancy-the preferred 
fallback in conservative communities-may also be less than ideal. A "shotgun 
marriage" will guarantee the woman a baseline level of support,50 but early 
marriages (particularly those "compelled by an improvident pregnancy") are 
more likely than other marriages to end in divorce. 51 Furthermore, the financial 
and emotional costs of dissolving a failed marriage may outweigh the tempo-
rary security it provides during pregnancy. Marriage provides a useful way to 
formalize intimate relations between lovers who would choose to marry regard-
less of the risk of procreative accidents. By standardizing a basket of rights and 
responsibilities between adults who intend to unite for life, it absolves couples 
of the need to deliberate and negotiate over every aspect of their union. Its 
maximalist one-size-fits-all defaults designate spouses as each others' primary 
beneficiaries, caretakers, guardians, agents, and representatives in all aspects of 
out of every two American women aged 15 to 44 has at least one unplanned pregnancy in 
her lifetime. Among unmarried women in their 20s, seven out of 10 pregnancies are un-
planned."); see also Rob Stein, Rise in Teenage Pregnancy Rate Spurs New Debate on Ar-
resting It, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2010, at A4. 
48. See LAUREN F. WINNER, REAL SEX: THE NAKED TRUTH ABOUT CHASTITY 17 (2005) 
("In 2001, a study of 6,800 students showed that virgins who took the [True Love Waits ab-
stinence] pledge were likely to abstain from sex for eighteen months longer than those who 
did not take the pledge. This ... means simply that a lot of abstinence pledgers are having 
sex at nineteen instead of eighteen."); Heather D. Boonstra, Advocates Call for a New Ap-
proach After the Era of "Abstinence-Only" Sex Education, GUTTMACHER PoL'Y REv., Win-
ter 2009, at 6, 8. 
49. WINNER, supra note 48, at 17. More broadly, rather than functioning as an insur-
ance policy against unintended procreation, marriage is more commonly the form of choice 
for couples who intend to conceive. "Many people today marry," write Kerry Abrams and 
Peter Brooks, 
once they think they have found the person they want to procreate with, not because they 
have decided to have sex for the first time and want to insure themselves against "accidents," 
but because they have been (irresponsibly?) engaging in sex for quite some time and only 
now are ready to settle down and have a child. 
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 43, at 32. 
50. The scope of this Article is limited to unmarried conception, but the treatment of 
pregnancy in marriage and divorce law, while better, is also lacking. 
51. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 47, at 60; see also id. at 26 ("[D]ivorce 
risk ... increases with younger age of marriage, lower economic status, and having a baby 
either prior to marriage or within the first seven months after marriage. Accordingly, family 
strategies that either emphasize marrying young, or marriage as the solution to an improvi-
dent pregnancy are likely to increase rates of divorce, all other things being equal." (footnote 
omitted)). 
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life-financial, medical, spiritual. In this capacity, spouses replace parents and 
siblings as a person's most significant legal relation. Though pregnancy and co-
parenting are life-altering undertakings, marriage binds people to a broader, 
more extensive commitment than is needed to protect lovers who conceive and 
their unplanned children. Thus when pregnancy is accidental, couples whose 
actual emotional relationship is not one of lifelong commitment may be better 
served by an intermediate status that is calibrated to their situation.52 The 
"shotgun" practice is at best an incomplete answer to the problem. Finally, even 
when parties are already married when they conceive, being married does not 
necessarily improve the woman's position because it may lock her into a harm-
ful relationship, 53 with the only alternative--divorce-having potentially de-
vastating economic consequences.54 
In sum, Justice Cordy and those who follow his lead are correct that acci-
dental procreation demands attention. We do need legal institutions that recog-
nize and support its consequences. But marriage is not the ultimate answer. A 
more coherent and honest approach would acknowledge the crossroads at 
which we stand. Marriage as we know it does not and cannot set the code for 
all unplanned pregnancies. An alternative form is needed. 55 
B. Collective Responsibility Towards Pregnant Women 
Another possibility is to follow Martha Fineman's lead and go to the oppo-
site extreme: abolish marriage altogether and instead privilege only caretaker-
52. See id at 59 ("[M]arriage at younger ages is a risky enterprise. It has historically 
required a high degree of community-reinforced socialization into marital roles-including 
stereotypical gender roles, male financial contributions and female dependence-to succeed. 
New research emphasizes that full emotional maturity does not occur until the mid-twenties, 
and the less than fully mature early twenties brain (especially if male) is primed for risk-
taking and sexual experimentation. At the same time, the modern economy provides fewer 
opportunities for the men who are ready to start families in their early twenties to move into 
productive employment." (footnotes omitted)); see also HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 5, 
at 276 ("Rather than try to force sexual actors into marriage, we choose to modify the anar-
chic state of nature that characterizes nonmarital sexual bargaining."). But see Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 225, 235 (noting that "even broken marriages provide financial and relationship 
benefits for dependent family members"). 
53. See JEANNIE SUK., AT HoME IN THE LAW 13-16 (2009) (discussing the marital home 
as a site of violence, the limitations of available legal remedies, and the difficulties women 
face in leaving abusive marriages). 
54. See ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 149-61 (2001); MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH 
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Appleton, supra note 2, at 296-97 (describing family law's 
failure to deliver on the presumed promises of marriage). 
55. For a broader argument that family law should recognize and support friendships 
that do not resemble marriage or marriage-like relationships, see Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REv. 189 (2007). 
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dependent relationships.56 Fineman starts from the premise that dependency is 
an inevitable aspect of our nature. "Far from being a 'pathological' condi-
tion ... it is an inevitable part of the human condition. It is universal-a deve-
lopmental and shared experience. All of us were dependent as children, and 
many of us will become dependent as we age, fall ill, or are disabled."57 To be 
human is to be dependent; to be human is to be vulnerable.58 It follows that all 
humans need to be cared for at some point in their lives. The people who do 
this caretaking-usually women 59 -in tum need to be supported themselves 
because "caretaking requires the sacrifice of autonomy and entails compromis-
es that negatively affect economic and market possibilities."60 As Robin West 
puts it: 
Emotionally and morally women may benefit from the dependency of the fe-
tus and the infant upon us. But materially we are more often burdened than 
enriched by that dependency. And because we are burdened, we differentially 
depend more heavily upon others, both for our own survival, and for the sur-
vival of the children who are part of us. Women, more than men, depend upon 
relationships with others, because the weakest of human beings-infants-
depend upon us. 
Thus, motherhood leaves us vulnerable: a woman giving birth is unable to 
defend herself against aggression; a woman nursing an infant is physically ex-
posed; a woman nurturing and feeding the young is less able to feed herself. 
Motherhood leaves us unequal .... 61 
56. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 54. For related arguments, see Alstott, supra 
note 29, at 6 (showing "how family law operates----<iespite its traditional private-law label-
as social insurance for affective life" and asking "whether public programs ought to address, 
more explicitly, the consequences of risks traditionally covered by family law-risks of di-
vorce, nonmarriage, parenthood, and childhood"); and Appleton, supra note 2, at 274-76 
(critiquing family law's sex-centricity). 
57. Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 239, 269 
(2001). 
58. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Essay, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equali-
ty in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008) ("I want to claim the term 
'vulnerable' for its potential in describing a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the hu-
man condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility."); id. 
at 12 ("The vulnerable subject approach does what the one-dimensional liberal subject ap-
proach cannot: it embodies the fact that human reality encompasses a wide range of differing 
and interdependent abilities over the span of a lifetime. The vulnerability approach recogniz-
es that individuals are anchored at each end of their lives by dependency and the absence of 
capacity."). 
59. See FINEMAN, supra note 54, at 162-63 ("Women, wives, mothers, daughters, 
daughters-in-law, sisters are typically the socially and culturally assigned caretakers. As ca-
retakers they are tied into intimate relationships with their dependents. The very process of 
assuming caretaking responsibilities creates dependency in the caretaker-she needs some 
social structure to provide the means to care for others."). 
60. Fineman, supra note 57, at 270. 
61. West, supra note 37, at 210. 
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The question then becomes, who bears the responsibility for these "inevit-
able dependents"62 (the children, the ill, the elderly) and the "derivative depen-
denc[ies]"63 of their caretakers? Currently, Fineman argues, we are myopically 
focused on sexual affiliations between men and women (i.e., marriage and its 
approximations) as the primary legally significant intimate connection and the 
framework through which we address dependency.64 "Marriage has historically 
served as the 'natural' repository for dependencies," she writes. "The family is 
the institution to which children, the elderly, and the ill are referred; it is the 
way that the state has effectively 'privatized' dependencies that otherwise 
might become the responsibility of the collective unit or state."65 
Fineman argues that this is the wrong approach because romantic relation-
ships do not, in fact, protect dependent caretakers. Though she notes that mar-
riage on an individual level is so specific in practice that any attempt at a gene-
ralized definition of the institution is meaningless,66 she emphasizes that 
historically, marriage has worked to disadvantage women.67 A family law that 
privileges sexual affiliates also casts other intimate forms as deviant, eclipsing 
discussion about the pressing problems of dependency throughout society, not 
just amongst pairs.68 Thus, it exacerbates dependencies by masking them.69 
Most importantly, relegating dependency to the nuclear family is wrong be-
cause "dependency is of concern well beyond the family. Dependency work is 
of benefit to the entire society."70 This is true not only because primary care-
takers' circumstances influence the children who will become the future citi-
zens of our world but also because the conditions of pregnant women influence 
62. Fineman, supra note 57, at 269. 
63. Id. at 270. 
64. See id. at 243. 
65. Jd. at 268; see also FINEMAN, supra note 54, at 226 ("In our individualistic society, 
the state relies on the family-allocating to it the care and protection of society's weaker 
members and the production and education of its future citizens."). 
66. See Fineman, supra note 57, at 241 ("Except in extreme situations, there are no le-
gal enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with standards of conduct imposed gen-
erally across marriages. The result might be characterized as creating a vacuum of legally 
mandated meaning for marriage-a vacuum that is to be filled with various non-legal, some-
times conflicting, individual aspirations, expectations, fears, and longings." (footnote omit-
ted)). 
67. See id. at 247 ("[M]arriage has not been a neutral social, cultural, or legal institu-
tion. It has shaped the aspirations and experiences of women and men in ways that have his-
torically disadvantaged women." (footnote omitted)). 
68. See id. at 246 ("Marriage, as the preferred societal solution, has become the prob-
lem. The very existence of this institution eclipses discussion and debate about the problems 
of dependency and allows us to avoid confronting the difficulty of making the transforma-
tions necessary to address these problems."). 
69. See id. 
70. Id. at 268. 
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their fetuses71-potentially replicating and perpetuating economic inequali-
ties.72 Thus Fineman would abolish marriage as a legal category,73 recognize 
"the parent-child relationship as the quintessential or core family connection [to 
be subsidized and supported], and focus on how policy can strengthen this 
tie."74 In sum, Fineman's vision 
leaves behind the obsession with the marital tie and is built around the care-
taker and dependent relationship. It is this relationship that should be subsi-
dized and protected. Recognizing both the inevitability of dependency and the 
society preserving work that caretakers do in meeting the demands of that de-
pendency, [she] argue[s] for the restructuring of our workplaces to accommo-
date a "dually responsible" worker, and the reinvigoration of our state so that 
caretaking and market work ... are compatible, accomplishable tasks. Only 
when this is accomplished will we have a society in which dependency is fair-
ly and justly managed.75 
As Fineman herself acknowledges, however, her project is utopian.16 Pub-
lic support for single pregnant women remains limited, 7 and support for un-
married women seeking an abortion, already scant, is on the decline.78 This is 
71. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 155 ("Increased rates of premature delivery and low 
birth weight among babies born to depressed pregnant women have been firmly established 
by research. Now scientists are exploring a startling but still speculative notion: that a preg-
nant woman's emotional state can influence the fetus's developing brain and nervous sys-
tem, potentially shaping the way the offspring will experience and manage its own emo-
tions-a kind of maternal impressions redux."). 
72. See id at 210 ("In recent years, [Douglas] Almond notes, early-life health meas-
ures of blacks have stagnated; black infants are two and a halftimes more likely to have low 
birth weight as white infants, and are more than twice as likely to die before age one. Given 
the potentially lasting effects of prenatal experience, Almond warns, it may be the case that 
'a future of racial inequality is being programmed."'). 
73. FINEMAN, supra note 54, at 228. 
74. Fineman, supra note 57, at 245. 
75. !d. at 271 (footnotes omitted). 
76. FINEMAN, supra note 54, at 232. 
77. See Rachel Benson Gold, Recession Taking Its Toll: Family Planning Safety Net 
Stretched Thin as Service Demand Increases, GUTTMACHER PoL'Y REV., Winter 2010, at 8, 
11-12 (examining the recession's harsh impact on women of reproductive age and acknowl-
edging that many women, even before the recession, were uninsured without sufficient pub-
lic support for family planning). Indeed, even California, a state once touted for its "land-
mark healthcare programs," has proposed limiting the state's Medicaid program for pregnant 
women by reducing eligibility requirements from 200% to 133% of the poverty level. See 
Tom Eley, U.S. States Slash Medicaid, GLOBAL REs. (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=l7743; see also Shane Goldmach-
er & Evan Halper, Schwarzenegger's Revised Budget Plan Is Expected to Eliminate Health 
Programs, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at AAL 
78. Since 1976, Congress has passed various versions of legislation known as the 
Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funding to pay for abortions except 
when a mother's life is in danger, or in the case of rape or incest. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434. Although abortion remains legally permissible, 
the Hyde Amendment makes it difficult for women without independent resources to obtain 
one. See Heather Boonstra & Adam Sonfield, Rights Without Access: Revisiting Public 
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not to say that efforts to increase collective responsibility for dependency are 
futile, and advances in this direction are being made. For example, provisions 
in the recently passed health reform law benefiting pregnant women and teens 
(read in isolation from the law's abortion-related provisions) are a positive de-
velopment.79 But in the current climate, even the most generous public pro-
gram is unlikely to adequately support the pregnant unwed. Thus, in addition to 
working towards increasing public pregnancy-related benefits, something more 
is needed. Furthermore, as I explain in the next Subpart, regardless of such 
public support, women and the men with whom they conceive form a special 
relationship that demands its own legal category. 
Marriage is changing, but it is not going away. In fact, its variations are 
multiplying, and the theme unifying its progeny-civil unions, domestic part-
nerships, and the infinite variety of marriages defined by individually crafted 
premarital agreements-continues to be the sexually affiliated dyad. Rather 
than focus on futile attempts to stem the tide, we should recognize it as reality. 
As long as marriage and marriage-like privileges exist for some citizens, ex-
tending them to a greater diversity of relationships is preferable to the status 
quo.so 
Funding of Abortion for Poor Women, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. PoL'Y, Apr. 2000, at 8, 10 
("[R]estrictions on funding have considerable impact on women's reproductive deci-
sions .... [P]regnancies that would have otherwise been aborted are instead carried to 
term .... [W]omen who are able to raise the money needed for an abortion do so at a great 
sacrifice to themselves and their families."); Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Dis-
parities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. 
ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 95 (2006) (noting that even though indigent women are 
two times as likely not to have health insurance, "the only federal stream of dollars dedicated 
to family planning services for low-income women[] declined between 1994 and 2001 "); 
GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2011), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf ("About 20% of abortion patients 
report using Medicaid to pay for abortions (virtually all in states where abortion services are 
paid for with state dollars)."); NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, PUBLIC FUNDING FOR ABORTION: 
MEDICAID AND THE HYDE AMENDMENT 2 (2006), http://prochoice.org/pubs_research/ 
publications/downloads/about_ abortion/public_ funding. pdf ("Barriers to abortion access 
such as the lack of providers, state laws delaying women from receiving timely care, and 
funding restrictions like the Hyde Amendment fall disproportionately on low-income women 
who have limited resources with which to overcome these obstacles."). 
79. See The New Health Care Reform Legislation: Pros and Cons for Reproductive 
Health, supra note 23 (stating that the "16 million more Americans to join Medicaid by 2019 
[under the health care reform will] .... receive the program's guarantee of family planning 
services without cost sharing, along with coverage for its comprehensive package of repro-
ductive health services beyond family planning"). 
80. I also support retracting these privileges from economically independent spouses. 
See i~a note 188. 
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C. Mandatory Preglimony and the Relational Default 
Nonmarital intimate relationships used to inhabit a legal no-man's-land. 
Over the past few decades, however, courts and legislatures have begun to rec-
ognize unmarried partners who live together as forming a unique type of rela-
tionship under theories that parallel contractual and equity-based theories of 
marriage. Where a couple formalizes their domestic partnership and then one 
partner abandons the other, "palimon(81 relief to the abandoned partner may 
be granted under contract principles. 2 Where a couple has made no explicit 
agreement formalizing their commitment, many jurisdictions nevertheless rec-
ognize that a partnership was formed and provide protections when the rela-
tionship breaks down under either an implied contract theory83 or an equity-
based status approach. 84 
A similar logic applies to sexual partners who conceive, whether or not 
they live together. From a contractual perspective, partners who conceive 
should be recognized under the rubric of a distinct legal relationship because, in 
many sexual relationships, an agreement to assume mutual obligations of sup-
port and communication can be inferred. In these types of relationships, each 
sexual connection implies a promise, an engagement of sorts to maintain some 
semblance of a relationship, some minimal modicum of collective responsibili-
ty and care should the woman become pregnant. 
But even where such an agreement cannot be inferred, sexual partners who 
conceive should be legally responsible to each other for normative reasons. 
When a man and a woman have nonreproductive sex, they knowingly engage 
in an act that has a reasonable possibility of radically interfering with the wom-
an's life, and disproportionately so. If neither party expects an ongoing com-
mitment, a lovers-as-strangers rule is appropriate. But where their expectations 
81. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the term back to the late 1970s, linking it 
with the California Supreme Court landmark case Marvin v. Marvin, which recognized sup-
port rights arising from a cohabitation relationship. See 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Palimony 
Definition, OED.COM, http://oed.com/view/Entry/136318 (last visited Jan. 6, 201 0). 
82. Most jurisdictions that recognize domestic partners as forming a legally significant 
relationship follow the contractual approach introduced in Marvin v. Marvin. Under this ap-
proach, divorce-type property distribution rules apply to separating domestic partners who 
have explicitly agreed to formalize their union in a marriage-like relationship. 
83. See Scott, supra note 52, at 258; Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will 11-
13 (Bar-Han Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 06-09, 
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1352043. 
84. A minority of jurisdictions and the American Law Institute's Principles of Family 
Dissolution reject the contractual approach in favor of a status-based solution. Contract is 
seen as a poor vehicle for regulating intimate relations for two main reasons. First, as ALI 
chief reporter Ira Ellman put it, "people do not think of their intimate relationships in con-
tract terms." Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 1365, 1373 (2001). Second, the contract rubric fails to address the equitable 
claims of abandoned partners where no implied agreement can be reasonably inferred. !d. at 
1372 & n.39. 
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diverge, the current default exacerbates imbalances in power and risk. In these 
types of relationships, when an unwanted pregnancy occurs, fairness requires 
that the material cost should be distributed between the two parties. 
Fineman is right that dependency is inevitable and that its burdens extend 
to caretakers. She may also be right that the world would be a better place if 
women could have sexual relationships with whomever they wished, and for 
however long, relying on kinship ties and community support when they be-
came pregnant. But the "sexual family"85 persists as the dominant form in our 
society because sex and procreation are related and because-whether we are 
biologically or culturally programmed to do so-fathers and mothers tend to 
have a special relationship with each other. I agree with Fineman that the "core 
family connection"-the primary connection that deserves legal recognition 
and support-should not be marriage or sexual affiliation. 86 But I do not think 
the mother/child or caretaker/dependent relationship is the only relationship 
that should matter. Rather, in addition to the vertical relationship between care-
taker and dependent, the horizontal relationship between individuals who share 
responsibility for a dependent is also critical.87 A pregnant woman and the man 
with whom she conceives inhabit a murky middle ground between complete 
strangers and co-parents. Regardless of whether life begins at conception or 
whether a fetus can be said to be a "dependent," a pregnant woman is providing 
for a potential dependent. This reality diminishes her ability to survive on her 
own and creates a special relationship between her and the man with whom she 
conceived. 
A man's obligation towards his pregnant lover might be analogized to the 
support obligations of a breadwinner towards a dependent spouse. Naturally, a 
sexual relationship implies a much lower level of commitment than betrothal, 
but, I would like to suggest, it falls along the same spectrum. Sex implies a 
baseline level of responsibility-a promise. In some communities, conception 
is tantamount to an engagement to marry. In others, the man is expected to do 
much less, but few people think he has no responsibilities. Accordingly, the 
justifications behind continued postdissolution support in the marital context-
alimony-parallel the justifications behind my proposed pregnancy-support ob-
ligation-preglimony. 
One common justification for alimony is contract based. Marriage implies 
a promise to share economic resources for life. When that promise is broken, 
the dependent spouse is entitled to an ongoing share of the higher-earning 
spouse's income because he or she has relied on the marital unity promise and 
85. Fineman uses this term "to emphasize that our societal and legal images and ex-
pectations of family are tenaciously organized around a sexual affiliation between a man and 
a woman." FINEMAN, supra note 54, at 143. 
86. Fineman, supra note 57, at 245. 
87. As I have argued elsewhere, I also believe that horizontal relationships between 
adults who do not share a dependent, but who share their resources, should be recognized 
under a separate rubric. See Motro, A New "/Do," supra note 45. 
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reasonably expected to be supported over time. An alternative justification 
awards alimony based on a rehabilitative theory-alimony's function is to tide 
dependent spouses over until they can "get back on their feet" and support 
themselves. A related theory links alimony to needs that result "from the unfair 
allocation of the financial losses arising from the marital failure."88 A final ra-
tionale frames alimony in restitutionary terms: its function is to make whole a 
spouse who sacrificed career opportunities in order contribute to the marriage 
in nonmonetary ways. 89 
Each of these theories is relevant for the unmarried couple facing a preg-
nancy. Again, sex can be viewed as a promise of sorts; when the promise is 
broken and pregnancy support is not forthcoming, preglimony ensures that the 
breaching party pays his fair share. Preglimony will also ensure that a pregnant 
woman who is temporarily unable to provide for herself will be taken care of 
during a transitional period. Third, it ensures that the financial losses arising 
from the sexual relationship will be allocated fairly. And finally, if the assump-
tion of risk is a type of "contribution" to a relationship, preglimony ensures that 
the man contributes too if the woman becomes pregnant. (In this sense, pregli-
mony might be understood as a way to prevent unjust enrichment. )90 
How might a mandatory preglimony regime work in practice? I explore 
this question in further detail in The Price of Pleasure.91 My main goal in that 
piece was to introduce the principle of a relational default to replace the current 
lovers-as-strangers paradigm governing nonmarital conception. Specifically, I 
argued that the material costs of pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage, and abor-
tion should be shared by both the woman and the man with whom she con-
ceives. That article also laid out a range of possibilities for how the amount of a 
man's preglimony obligation might be set. One possibility is that it be based on 
the costs associated with each particular pregnancy broadly defined, including 
not only medical costs but also indirect costs like lost wages, maternity clothes, 
and childbirth classes. Alternatively, the preglimony obligation might be based 
on a more objective standard, like the length of the pregnancy and/or the par-
ties' financial situation. The relational default would not apply to pregnancies 
conceived through rape or fraud and partners who do not want to be governed 
by the relational standard would be free to opt out of it. These exceptions not-
withstanding, preglimony would apply to most nonmarital pregnancies. Again, 
no-strings-attached sex isn't inherently wrong; it's just the wrong legal default. 
The most frequent objection I hear to the full-blown preglimony proposal 
is the fear that it will shift the decisionmaking power over abortion to men. 
88. AM. LAWINST., supra note 13, § 5.02 cmt. a, at 789. 
89. For further discussion of justifications for alimony, see DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET 
AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 548-52 (2006); and KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE 
B. SILBAUGH, FAMILY LAW 135-46 (2009). 
90. I credit Susan Appleton for this insight. 
91. See Motro, supra note 8. 
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Specifically, since pregnancy support (and child support) will likely be lower if 
the woman terminates the pregnancy, the concern is that preglimony will in-
crease abortions. In my opinion, this objection collapses a critical distinction. 
Yes, once men have to pay they will be brought into the conversation and have 
an opportunity to share their feelings and preferences. In this sense, they will 
have a say, but that does not mean they will have the final say over abortion. 
Opening the door to greater male participation in women's reproductive deci-
sions is dangerous only if we assume that the imbalance of power so heavily 
tilts towards the man that he will always, by definition, steamroll over the 
woman's preferences. But preliminary data on the influence of child support 
enforcement on the incidence of abortion suggests that the opposite may be 
true-abortions drop as child support enforcement rises.92 To be sure, the con-
cern that once men participate in bearing the costs of pregnancy they may pres-
sure women to have (or not to have) an abortion is relevant in some cases. It is 
possible that these cases justify a lovers-as-strangers default, but over the long 
haul, the current rule may do more harm than good. "Protecting" women by as-
signing to them most of the material burdens of pregnancy and abortion perpe-
tuates the perception that pregnancy is a woman's problem and shuts men out 
of a process that implicates them in profound ways. Pregnancy that results from 
consensual sex where the partners have not agreed on a no-strings-attached ar-
rangement concerns both parties to the act. Ideally, the law should treat it ac-
cordingly. 
Nevertheless, the mandatory preglimony proposal requires further study 
before it can be implemented. Among the most pressing challenges is devising 
valuation, administration, and enforcement mechanisms that are not prohibi-
tively expensive. Another challenge parallels a challenge common in the child 
support context: The goal of the child support system is to ensure that all par-
ents support their children. But child support obligations that exceed a parent's 
realistic ability to pay sometimes work to alienate parents from children and to 
snowball the already indigent into more dire financial turmoi1.93 Preglimony 
that is not carefully calibrated to each situation might have similar effects. Fi-
nally, there is a danger that calls for mandatory preglimony will result in a 
backlash. Specifically, some fringe men's rights groups already challenge man-
datory child support rules by arguing that men should have a right to a so-called 
92. The number of abortions falls as the expectation that men will have to pay child 
support rises because women are "encouraged by the potential economic security that the 
father may provide." Crowley, Jagannathan & Falchettore, supra note 32, at 22. A similar 
dynamic may lead pregnant women who are considering an abortion because they are wor-
ried about loss of income due to their pregnancy to take the pregnancy to term once they 
know additional preglimony support will be coming. 
93. For a discussion of the negative effects of the current child support paradigm on 
never-married poor fathers, see Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining 
Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 991 (2006). 
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"financial abortion. "94 These activists believe that a man should be able to 
"buy" his way out of child support obligations by paying his pregnant partner a 
sum equal to the cost of an abortion. Although no legal authority takes their 
claims seriously,95 mandatory preglimony may increase support for these atti-
tudes. 
While we are studying these issues, however, there is something simpler 
and less controversial we can do more quickly. As a first step towards recogniz-
ing and integrating the relational paradigm, we can support and reward men 
who already participate in the costs of pregnancy through the tax code. Unlike a 
mandatory pregnancy-support regime paralleling the cumbersome alimony and 
child support systems, tax reform offers a much leaner alternative. By creating 
an incentive for support rather than imposing sanctions for failure to support, it 
sidesteps thorny enforcement issues and encourages cooperation rather than 
conflict. Incentivizing rather than requiring support also responds to some 
men's fear that they will be duped into impregnating a woman. Though manda-
tory preglimony as I envision it would not apply where the woman engaged in 
foul play (e.g., lying about birth control) evidentiary challenges make this ex-
ception difficult to enforce. Tax reform based on voluntary preglimony avoids 
this problem. 
To be clear, the remainder of this Article proposes to use tax law for the 
narrow purpose of bolstering public support for the relational aspects of preg-
nancy. Again, in an ideal world, greater public support for pregnant women re-
gardless of their relational status would be forthcoming. Thus, I would support 
a tax credit available to all pregnant women in need-including those estranged 
from the man with whom they conceived as well as those whose partner is also 
94. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women's Sexuality, 
56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1245 (2007); John Tierney, Op-Ed., Men's Abortion Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A25; Sherry F. Colb, Should Men Have the Right to a "Financial 
Abortion"? A Biological Father Cries Sex Discrimination When Forced to Pay Child Sup-
port for an Unwanted Baby, FINDLAW (Mar. 21, 2006), http://writ.news.fmdlaw 
.corn!colb/2006032l.html; Stephanie Fairyington, The Parent Trap: Paternal Rights and 
Abortion, ELLE.COM (May 17, 2010), http://www.elle.com/Life-Love/Society-Career-Power/ 
The-Parent-Trap-Paternal-Rights-and-Abortion. For New York Times readers' comments on 
the issue, see Readers' Comments to A Father's Reproductive Rights: What Happens When 
a Man Makes His Intentions Clear Before a Child Is Conceived or Born?, N.Y. TIMES 
MOTHERLODE BLOG, http://community.nytimes.com/comments/parenting.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2010/05/17/a-fathers-reproductive-rights/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). Many commen-
ters assert that a man should have no right to prevent a women from having an abortion and 
should be required to pay child support for a child he does not want, while some argue a 
man's opposition to a woman's decision to take a pregnancy to term should exempt him 
from having to pay child support. 
95. Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Parent's Child Support Liability as Affected by Other 
Parent's Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control, or Re-
fusal to Abort Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5th 337, 348 (1992) ("To date, the courts have refused to 
deem a woman's decision to bear a child despite the objections of the child's father, even 
where he has offered to pay for an abortion, to create an unconstitutional infringement on the 
father's federal or state equal protection or due process rights." (citation omitted)). 
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poor.96 But at this time, public support for indigent pregnant women remains 
limited.97 So long as community assistance to these women remains at its cur-
rent level, tax law can help incentivize and normalize greater financial support 
by men who do have the means to participate meaningfully in the fallout of 
pregnancy. The solution I offer gets at only a subset of the relevant cases: situa-
tions in which the pregnant woman earns significantly less than the man with 
whom she conceived. Thus it provides no help to poor couples, equal-earner 
couples, women whose income exceeds that of their partners, and most young 
couples. Instead, it begins with relatively low-hanging fruit-high-income men 
already predisposed to contribute to their pregnant lovers' welfare-pursuing a 
viable, symbolically potent first step towards breaking the silence on this issue. 
III. THE PREGNANCY-SUPPORT DEDUCTION 
When unmarried lovers conceive and the man helps support the woman 
through pregnancy, miscarriage, or abortion, how is this support treated for tax 
purposes? How should it be?98 Current tax law is silent on preglimony pay-
ments, but it most likely treats them as neither deductible to the payor nor in-
cludible by the recipient. By contrast, married and divorced taxpayers who 
support each other and whose incomes diverge can shift high-bracket income to 
a lower bracket, producing a tax benefit. As I argue below, preglimony is more 
like an intraspousal transfer or alimony than a transfer between strangers, 
friends, or siblings. It should be treated accordingly. 
A. The Current Income Tax Treatment of Pregnancy-Related Transfers 
1. A primer on the taxation of personal transfers 
Before we turn to the ideal treatment of preglimony, let's take a brief tour 
of the basic principles undergirding our income tax system so we may consider 
the full range of possibilities. The current income tax system measures income 
by "accessions to wealth."99 In general, this means that receipts are taxable and 
expenditures are not deductible unless they represent the costs of producing in-
96. Some "65 percent of unmarried fathers have incomes below $20,000, with about 
19 percent reporting incomes below $5,000." WALLER, supra note 35, at 49. 
97. See supra Part II.B. 
98. I limit the scope of this Article to the income tax consequences of pregnancy-
related transfers and disregard any gift tax implication because in most cases the transfers 
either fall below the yearly gift tax exclusion amount ($13,000 for 2010) or include pay-
ments for medical care which, if paid directly to the provider, are exempted from gift taxes. 
99. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The normative base for 
the Glenshaw formulation and for the current tax system is the Haig-Simons definition of 
income as the sum of consumption and savings. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME 
TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 ( 1938). 
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come. 100 Tax law does, however, deviate from this principle. Some receipts 
may be excluded from income despite the fact that they raise the taxpayer's 
wealth, and some expenditures may be deducted despite the fact that they are 
clearly personal in nature. Thus, when one taxpayer transfers property to anoth-
er, four consequences may result. Assuming the taxpayers are not married and 
that one is not a dependent of the other, 101 the transfer may: 
(a) be neither includible by the recipient nor deductible to the payor (as 
when an individual gives a gift to another individual102); 
(b) result in taxable income to the recipient and a deduction to the payor 
(this is what happens when an employer compensates an employee working in 
her business 103); 
(c) result in taxable income to the recipient without a corresponding deduc-
tion allowance to the payor (as when an individual compensates a housekeeper, 
gardener, or other purveyor of personal services 1 04); or 
(d) produce no taxable income to the recipient and be deductible to the 
payor (as when an individual makes a charitable contribution105). 
The significance of each possibility may be demonstrated as follows. As-
sume a payor whose taxable income is $100,000 transfers $20,000 to a reci-
pient whose taxable income is $60,000. Assume also, for simplicity, a rate 
schedule with only two brackets. Taxable income that does not exceed $80,000 
is taxed at a ten percent rate, taxable income above $80,000 is taxed at a thirty-
five percent rate. 
100. See 26 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006). 
101. If the woman qualifies as the man's dependent, the tax system provides several 
benefits. Section 213(a) gives the payor a deduction for certain medical expenses paid on 
behalf of a dependent, § 151 provides a personal exemption for dependents, and § 21 pro-
vides a credit for the costs of household and dependent care services if the dependent is in-
capable of caring for herself. (The credit is available if the services procured are necessary 
for the supporting taxpayer's gainful employment. Thus, an employed man whose pregnant 
domestic partner is confmed to bed rest can receive a credit for hiring a nurse on her behalf.) 
For a more detailed list of tax benefits available to taxpayers providing for a dependent, see 
Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 1529, 1543 n.35 (2008). See also 26 U.S.C. § 223 (allowing a deduction for amounts 
paid into a health savings account on behalf of a dependent). 
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 102. 
103. See id. §§ 6l(a)(l), 162. 
104. See id. §§ 6l(a)(l), 262. 
105. See id. § 170. 
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Thus, a transfer may be taxed once (alternatives (a) and (b)), twice (alterna-
tive (c)), or not at all (alternative (d)). From the taxpayers' collective perspec-
106. Graphic design by Jonathan Corum. 
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tive, (c) is the worst outcome and (d) is the best. If, as in alternatives (a) and 
(b), the transfer is taxable income to only one of the two taxpayers, the overall 
tax liability associated with it will be lower if the liability falls on the taxpayer 
whose marginal rate is the lower of the two. It follows that if, as in the illustra-
tion, the recipient is in a lower bracket than the payor, the transfer will be sub-
ject to a lower tax rate if it is includible by the recipient and deductible by the 
payor than if it is excludible by the recipient and nondeductible to the payor. 
That is, all else being equal, (b) is better for the taxpayers as a "team" than (a). 
It is in order to prevent this "income-shifting" advantage that Congress 
does not extend the deduction/inclusion rule in scenario (b) to most personal 
transfers. Rather, income is generally taxable to the individual who earns it107 
or who owns the pro~erty that generates it108 even if she assigns that income to 
another individual. 10 As Justice Holmes famously put it, fruits may not be "at-
tributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."110 
Congress has carved out one major exception to this assignment of income 
prohibition: marriage. Regardless of whether spouses in fact share their in-
comes, they are effectively treated as if each spouse earned half of their com-
bined income, at least at lower income levels. It accomplishes this result 
through a rate structure for married taxpayers filing jointly that uses brackets 
approximately twice as wide as those applied to individuals. 111 Another way of 
describing the effective result is that tax law assumes that the high earner trans-
ferred to the low earner enough income so as to make the spouses equal, and 
blesses the assumed transfer with the deduction/inclusion alternative of scena-
rio (b). For couples whose incomes diverge significantly, this produces a mar-
riage bonus (i.e., it makes them better off than an unmarried couple whose 
transfers are treated as nondeductible/excludible gifts as in (a)). 112 Extending 
the benefit beyond marriage, tax law also permits a divorced spouse paying 
alimony (usually the higher earner) to deduct the payment provided the reci-
107. See Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949); Helvering v. Eubank, 
311 U.S. 122,124-25 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111,114-15 (1930). 
108. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117-20 (1940); Blairv. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5, 
12-14 (1937). 
109. See generally 3 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS~ 75.2 (2d ed. 1991). 
110. Earl, 281 U.S. at 115. For a critique of the fruit-and-the-tree metaphor, see Patricia 
A. Cain, The Story of Earl: How Echoes (and Metaphors) from the Past Continue to Shape 
the Assignment of Income Doctrine, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 275,276-79 (PaulL. Caron ed., 2003). 
Ill. For a more detailed discussion of the way in which the rate structure produces a 
marriage bonus for unequal earners and a marriage penalty for equal earners, see EDWARD J. 
McCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 12-19 (1997); and Motro, A New "!Do," supra note 45, at 
1560-68. 
112. The joint return reduces their overall tax liability because with a progressive rate 
structure, the tax on two people earning $50,000 is less than the tax on one person earning 
$100,000. 
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pient (the low earner) includes it; 113 thus, the taxes on the payment are based 
on the recipient's lower marginal rate. Child support payments, by contrast, are 
seen as inherently personal, and as such they are nondeductible to the payor and 
excludible to the receiving custodial parent.114 
FIGURE3 
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113. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (2006). The deduction/inclusion of alimony is the default 
treatment, but taxpayers may elect to designate payments as nondeductible to the payor and 
excludible by the recipient. Id. § 7l(a), (b)(1)(B). 
114. Bittker and Lokken explain that the underlying theory for this rule is that "child 
support payments do not reflect a diversion [of] income from one spouse to the other be-
cause they are not for the payee's benefit." 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 109, 1 77.1.7; 
see also Knight v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1519, 1523 (1992) (explaining that the child 
support a man pays to the mother of his child "goes toward the support of their children, not 
for her benefit or enjoyment as is the case of alimony" and that "personal, living, and family 
expenses (including the cost of supporting one's child) are not deductible by any taxpayer" 
(citing 26 U.S.C. § 262 (1988))). But see infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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2. The current taxation of preglimony 
No authority has addressed the proper income tax treatment of pregnancy-
related transfers. 11 5 Current law regarding these types of payments is therefore 
a matter of conjecture. If asked to rule on the issue, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice might characterize them as either child support or as gifts, depending on 
the jurisdiction and on the particular circumstances of the pregnancy. In either 
case, the payments would be nondeductible to the payor and excludible by the 
recipient. In short, both alternatives are essentially disregarded for tax purpos-
es. 
a. Child support characterization 
In jurisdictions that frame a man's pregnancy-related obligations as an 
element of child support, payments made pursuant to this obligation might be 
treated accordingly for tax purposes (i.e., he would not be permitted to deduct 
the payments and the woman would not be required to include them). 116 This is 
because federal income tax consequences generally track state law's characteri-
zation of a given event. 117 Child support characterization is also consistent with 
the Tax Court's holding that pregnancy-related medical payments made by 
adoptive parents on the birth mother's behalf may be treated as payments on 
behalf of their unborn "dependent" if the payments can be disentangled from 
payments necessary for the care of the mother. 118 
115. The IRS has also been silent regarding the broader issue of other support payments 
between unmarried couples either during the partnership or after dissolution. See Patricia A. 
Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805, 829 (2008). 
This Article addresses only income tax issues. Gift tax issues arise only with respect to 
payments that exceed $13,000, the annual gift tax exclusion amount for 2010. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 2503(b)(1) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617. For many unmarried lovers 
who conceive, this means the only relevant question concerns income tax treatment. 
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 71(c); Knight, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1523 ("[C]hild support pay-
ments are neither deductible by the payor nor taxable to the recipient. ... [N]o parent may 
deduct the cost of supporting his or her child; no distinction is made between parents who 
are married or unmarried, parents who are married to each other or to others, or parents hav-
ing or not having custody of the child."). In the surrogate motherhood context, some attor-
neys advise surrogates not to include payments they receive from the intended fathers under 
the theory that these payments are child support. On the other hand, some scholars argue 
these payments are compensation. See Bridget J. Crawford, Taxation, Pregnancy, and Priva-
cy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 327, 343-45 (2010); Bridget J. Crawford, Taxing Surro-
gacy, in CHALLENGING GENDER INEQUALITY IN FISCAL POLICY MAKING: COMPARATIVE 
RESEARCH ON TAXATION (Asa Gunnarsonn et al. eds., forthcoming May 2011) (manuscript at 
2), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1422180. 
117. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 194-96 (1971); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 
U.S. 101, 110 (1930); see also Cain, supra note 115, at 838-39. 
118. See Kilpatrick v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 469, 472-73 (1977). Kilpatrick deals with 
whether adoptive parents were allowed to deduct the expenses incurred for medical services 
rendered to their son's natural mother under 26 U.S.C. § 213, which provides a deduction for 
certain medical care expenses incurred on behalf of a taxpayer's dependent. The court ac-
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However, the characterization of pregnancy-related payments as child sup-
port might be challenged as inconsistent with another aspect of the tax system: 
the treatment of the gestational period for purposes of determining personal ex-
emptions. If pregnancy-related transfers are indeed child support, the pregnant 
woman should be eligible to take a dependency deduction in her capacity as the 
custodial parent.119 The Court ofF ederal Claims, however, has clearly held that 
a taxpayer is not entitled to a de~endency exemption for a tax year in which an 
"unborn child" is still in utero. 12 
b. Gift characterization 
Even if pregnancy-related payments classified as child support for state law 
purposes are not deemed to be child support for federal tax purposes, 121 they 
might still be neither includible by the recipient nor deductible to the payor un-
der the theory that they constitute gifts. The same holds for pregnancy-related 
payments made pursuant to state laws that do not frame the obligation as an 
element of child support but rather as an obligation towards the woman her-
knowledged that "medical care rendered to an expectant mother may, under certain circums-
tances, constitute medical care rendered to her child." 68 T.C. at 472 (emphasis added). 
"Prior to the child's birth," the court explains, "the health of the mother is so intimately con-
nected with the health of the child that to say a service rendered to one could never be a ser-
vice rendered to the other belies believability." Jd at 472-73. However, the court placed the 
burden on the adoptive parents seeking to take the deduction to prove that "the expenses in 
question were directly or proximately related to the 'diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease' in the unborn child." !d. at 473 (quoting Havey v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 
409,412 (1949)). In the absence of such proof, it held the entire amount to be a nondeducti-
ble personal expense. !d.; see also Hornish v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 919 (1978) (deny-
ing deduction to adoptive parents for failure to prove what portion, if any, of delivery fees 
constituted medical care for the child). 
119. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(c). 
120. Cassman v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 121, 123-24 (1994). In a brief filed in Mag-
dalin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008), a.ff'd, No. 09-1153, 2009 WL 5557509 
(1st Cir. Dec. 17, 2009), Cassman was cited for the proposition that "an unborn child is not a 
dependent." See Katherine Pratt, Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: Implications of 
Magdalin v. Commissioner for Opposite-Sex Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, 
and Single Women and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REv. 1283, 1315. 
121. For examples of situations in which federal income tax treatment does not track 
state law, see Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1388 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a 
divorce that is valid under state law may nevertheless be deemed invalid for federal income 
tax purposes under the sham transaction doctrine); Deborah A. Geier, SimplifYing and Ratio-
nalizing the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX LAW. 363, 
363 n.3 (2002) ("[P]ayments subject to the inclusion/deduction scheme [of alimony for fed-
eral tax purposes] may not actually constitute 'alimony' under state law, so long as the pay-
ment satisfies the federal tax definition of 'alimony' in section 7l(b)."); and Deborah H. 
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REv. 
121, 135 (1989) ("[T]he Code provides a special federal defmition of an abandoned spouse 
so that a taxpayer who is married for state law purposes may be single for federal purpos-
es."). 
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self. 122 Gift treatment might also apply to payments that exceed those required 
by any jurisdiction's law (including support for a woman undergoing and reco-
vering from an abortion). This is true despite the fact that the circumstances in 
which these payments are made may, but often do not, match the law's official 
test for tax-free gifts, which hinges on the payor's intent. 
Under the test coined in Commissioner v. Duberstein, to qualify as a gift 
for income tax purposes the payment must arise out of "detached and disinte-
rested generosity."123 It must be made "out of affection, respect, admiration, 
charity or like impulses."124 Pregnancy-related payments rarely fit this bill. 
When they come from the man who is "responsible" because he feels it is his 
duty they are inherently not detached and disinterested. The case clearly states 
that a payment that arises from either a legal or a moral obligation cannot quali-
fy for gift treatment. 125 The Duberstein test also precludes from gift treatment 
payments proceeding from the '"incentive of anticipated benefit' of an econom-
ic nature." 126 In some instances, payments towards an abortion are very much 
self-interested. Surely there are some men who support their pregnant lovers 
purely out of love and generosity, but in many instances an element of duty is 
present as well. Thus, the gift treatment of many of these payments does not fit 
well with the doctrine. 
Pregnancy-related transfers between lovers might nevertheless be treated as 
gifts because other payments between sexual partners have been classified as 
gifts by several courts in the past.127 Another reason why these payments might 
be nondeductible to the payor and excludible by the recipient is that the alterna-
tive leads to a counterintuitive result. In theory, every accession is income un-
less it is explicitly exempted128 and all personal expenditures are nondeductible 
unless specifically covered by a deduction allowance. Thus, if pregnancy-
related payments are not gifts, there is a possibility that the payments would be 
included in the recipient's income and nondeductible to the payor as in illustra-
tion (c) above. They would be taxed the same way we tax a person paying for a 
housekeeper or any other provider of services that are personal in nature-both 
122. See supra note 20. 
123. 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243,246 (1956)). 
124. Jd. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)). 
125. /d. ("[I]f the payment proceeds primarily from 'the constraining force of any moral 
or legal duty' ... it is not a gift." (quoting Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937))). 
126. Id. (quoting Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 41). 
127. See I BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 109, 'IJ 10.2.7 (surveying case law classifying 
"[t]ransfers of cash and property by a taxpayer to a companion or sexual partner ... as tax-
free gifts or taxable compensation, depending on whether the recipient appears to be a bene-
ficiary of generosity or a purveyor of services"). 
128. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code clearly provides that "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided ... gross income means all income from whatever source derived." 26 U.S.C. 
§ 61(a) (2006); see also supra note 99. 
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the payor and the recipient would bear a liability.129 In practice however, many 
transfers that do not fall neatly into the official definition of gifts and which are 
made in nonbusiness contexts are routinely disregarded by taxpayers and by the 
Internal Revenue Service alike. 130 As Boris Bittker and Lawrence Lokken put 
it in the context of their discussion ofintrafamily transfers that would not quali-
fy as gifts under the law's technical definition, such transfers "can be properly 
viewed as excludable by a higher authority than the language of § 1 02(a)-a 
supposition, so obvious that it does not require explicit mention in the [Internal 
Revenue] Code, that Congress never intended to tax them."131 
In sum, current principles suggest that pregnancy-related payments are ei-
ther child support or gifts for tax purposes. As such, they have no tax conse-
quences to either the payor or the recipient. 
While neutral on its face, this result has harmful consequences. First, as an 
expressive matter, treating pregnancy-related payments as child support disre-
gards the effects of pregnancy on the woman. Both child support and gift cha-
racterizations also disregard the reality that these payments tend to stem, at 
least in part, from the man's sense of his moral obligation to the woman herself. 
Second, from a utilitarian perspective, the current treatment misses a relatively 
simple opportunity to reward and encourage men who are inclined to help sup-
port their pregnant partners. 
Finally, while the gift/child support theory is reasonable, it is not certain. 
For reasons discussed above, if the IRS eventually reviews the tax status of 
pregnancy-related payments, it could take the position that they are neither gifts 
nor child support. In that case, they might be properly taxed twice (i.e., they 
may not be deductible to the payor and they may be taxable income to the reci-
pient).132 The result would put couples who conceive in a worse position than 
129. Indeed, some theorists believe this is the correct treatment of all gifts, but their ap-
proach has not held sway. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 99, at 56-58, 125-28. 
130. But see Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, a Limited Tax Credit 
for Child Support and Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 321, 329 (1994) ("Taxing the payment 
to both the payor and the payee is exactly what happens when ... personal liabilities [other 
than alimony] are paid. When money changes hands between taxpayers and there is no gift 
involved, ordinarily the money is taxed to each successive taxpayer who has been 
enriched."). 
131. 1 BIITKER&LOKKEN,supranote 109, ~ 10.2. 
132. For arguments in favor of treating alimony as nondeductible to the payor and in-
cludible by the recipient, see Geier, supra note 121, at 368 ("[I]fwe view the matter from the 
recipient's side alone, and if alimony is considered within the Glenshaw Glass notion of 'in-
come' as an undeniable accession to wealth, etc., then it would be includable by the reci-
pient. At the same time, the payor earning wages from which the alimony was paid would 
have to include the wages in gross income, since compensation for services rendered is spe-
cifically listed as 'income' in section 61(a)(1). Moreover, the payor would arguably be de-
nied a deduction for the payment under a strict defmition of 'income' in the familiar Schanz-
Haig-Simons sense, under which only outlays incurred to produce includable income are 
properly deductible (with personal consumption outlays being nondeductible, and thus 
taxed)."); and id. at 430. 
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all other taxpayers exchanging gifts. It would effectively treat the woman as the 
man's employee-like a housekeeper, she would be receiving gross income in 
exchange for performing a personal nondeductible service for him-an im-
probable but nevertheless disturbing outcome. 133 
B. The Pregnancy-Support Deduction 
How then should preglimony be taxed? First, it should be clear that not tax-
ing the transfers at all (i.e., providing a deduction/exclusion option similar to 
that applicable to charitable contributions (scenario (d))) is not a relevant op-
tion. It may seem appealing at first glance, but this approach would create a 
new type of marriage penalty because a high-earning man and a low-earning 
pregnant woman who share income would pay more if they marry than they 
would if, as unmarried, he can deduct and she can exclude the transfers. 134 
Again, taxing the transfer twice as in scenario (c) is an unlikely result consider-
ing current practices. 135 It would also be punitive and administratively cumber-
some as it would require detached and disinterested gifts to pregnant women to 
be disentangled from duty-inspired preglimony. The remaining choice, there-
fore, is to move from the status quo (no deduction/no inclusion) to an income-
shifting option (deduction/inclusion), which would produce a benefit in cases in 
which the payor's income is higher than the recipient's. 
133. For a discussion of why alimony is not taxed twice (i.e., to both payor and reci-
pient), see id at 368-71. 
134. To remedy this result a new credit or deduction for pregnant spouses might be in-
troduced, but for simplicity I will bracket this alternative and assume the current tax treat-
ment of spouses as a given. 
A deduction/exclusion would also be inconsistent with the current charitable contribu-
tions framework, which permits a deduction only for gifts to eligible charitable entities, not 
to individuals. 26 U.S.C. § 170(a), (c) (2006). 
135. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. 
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As we have seen, current tax law does not apply the general prohibition 
against income shifting to married taxpayers and to former spouses paying ali-
mony. It allows married taxpayers to shift income by means of a special rate 
schedule applicable only to spouses filing jointly.136 It allows former spouses 
agreeing on an alimony arrangement to elect to treat the payments as deductible 
to the payor and includible by the recipient. 137 
Though the justifications for both of these special rules are problematic, as 
long as they remain in force, similar treatment should extend to unmarried lov-
ers who conceive. The next Subpart surveys the main critiques of marriage- and 
divorce-based income-shifting benefits, and introduces a novel theory for why 
they remain deeply entrenched despite voluminous criticism they have re-
ceived. This theory suggests preglimony should be treated comparably. Then, I 
turn to utilitarian justifications for a deduction/inclusion approach to preglimo-
ny. 
1. Theoretical justification 
Marriage-based joint filing has been the subject of much criticism, 138 
136. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
137. 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(10), 71(a)-(b), 215(a). To qualify for this treatment the pay-
ments must be in cash and they must be made pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument. 
!d. § 71(a)-(b). 
138. See McCAFFERY, supra note 111, at 11-85; Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Sta-
tus as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1980); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax 
Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A 
Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983 (1993); Law-
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which I will not review here, except to reiterate139 that the most compelling ra-
tionale for retaining it-an assumption that marriage serves as a proxy for eco-
nomic unity-is faulty. In most states, spouses have no obligation to share in-
come during marriage, and many marriages are clearly (sometimes contract-
ually) not fifty-fifty propositions. There is no defensible reason to assume that 
spouses whose union is governed by a premarital agreement separating their 
economic identities actually share to the point of equalizing their incomes, and 
there is no reason to then exempt these imaginary transfers from the assignment 
of income doctrine. 
The deduction/inclusion option available to former spouses paying alimony 
also rests on a shaky foundation. The original rationale for the rule was to miti-
gate the effects of marginal rates as high as ninety-one percent in the early 
1940s. 140 The force of this rationale diminished as the rate structure became 
less steep!~ progressive, but scholars point to other theories for the system's 
endurance 41 including mitigating the financial hardship of divorce, 142 promot-
ing equity between "wealthy" and "less wealthy" divorcing couples, 143 and in-
centivizing higher alimony payments.144 The leading theory is that the rule es-
sentially extends to former spouses the income-splitting benefits to which they 
were entitled during marriage because divorce does not end their economic145 
renee Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 
TAX L. REv. l, 3 (2000); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 339 (1994) [hereinafter Zelenak, Marriage and Tax]. 
139. See Motro, A New "I Do," supra note 45. 
140. See Geier, supra note 121, at 371-72; Gerzog Shaller, supra note 130, at 322. 
141. See Gerzog Shaller, supra note 130, at 322-23 (noting that since the original 
enactment of the alimony provision "its repeal, which could be seen as a natural concomitant 
with the enactment of lower rates, has not been seriously contemplated" (footnote omitted)). 
142. See Geier, supra note 121, at 396 ("Since divorce frequently strains liquidity to the 
breaking point anyway, in the view of the Task Force, such a harsh result, i.e., divorce per se 
pushing incomes into higher brackets, should be avoided, if possible." (quoting AM. BAR 
AsS'N'S DOMESTIC RELATIONS TAX SIMPLIFICATION TASK FORCE, THE "INCOME-SHIFTING" 
PRINCIPLE IN PROPOSALS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS TAX LAW 5 (1983))); 
id. at 435 ("Divorce is usually accompanied by financial hardship (and it triples the chances 
of bankruptcy). Therefore, Congress should avoid adopting what would amount to amanda-
tory divorce tax 'penalty' in many cases."). Geier makes the related argument that taxing the 
payments twice would also affirmatively discourage divorce. See id. at 370. 
143. See id. at 435 ("[A] mandatory exclusion/nondeduction rule would also introduce a 
disparity between less wealthy couples, where support payments must come from future 
wages of the payor, and wealthy couples, who could still engage in significant income-
shifting by transferring income-producing assets to the payee to fund support."). 
144. See id.; Michael Waggoner, IRC § 71 May Impoverish Children, Endanger Ex-
Wives, and Disrupt Federalism, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 574 (2008). 
145. See Cain, supra note 115, at 828 ("The underlying principle [for the alimony rule] 
is that the now-divided family will only be taxed once on the income that is used to support 
its prior members. This principle is consistent with the notion that the spousal unit is a single 
economic unit for federal tax purposes."); Geier, supra note 121, at 369-70 
("[T]he ... appropriate way to think about the payment [of alimony is to] .... view both 
taxpayers together. In an intact marriage, by analogy, amounts earned by one spouse and 
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or legal146 relationship. Since marriage-based joint filing approximates income 
splitting, former spouses should be entitled to continue to shift the tax burden 
associated with income they share postdivorce to the party who actually bene-
fits from the income (i.e., the recipient). 
None of these theories is compelling. If the goal is to mitigate the financial 
hardship of divorce, the deduction/inclusion of alimony is a particularly ineffi-
cient mechanism for providing relief. The benefit it produces rises as income 
differentials between spouses rise, which also correlates with higher overall in-
come; lower-income couples are more likely to be equal earners and thus una-
ble to benefit from the deduction/inclusion at all. A better way to mitigate hard-
ships would be to provide a phased out credit for taxpayers whose household 
income drops as a result of divorce. 
The rule does promote equity between taxpayers who own income-
producing assets and those whose main income-generating asset is their career. 
This is because without the deduction/inclusion of alimony, property owners 
could transfer assets to their former spouses, effectively shifting these assets' 
income streams to the recipient's lower tax bracket, whereas professionals 
would have to pay taxes on their wage income first (at their own presumably 
higher rates) before transferring them to the lower-bracket alimony recipient. 147 
But this disparity exists between every transfer of cash as compared with in-
come-generating property. It's not clear why having been married should justi-
fy equalizing the earned/unearned income differential when it is largely ignored 
throughout the rest of the tax system. 
Incentivizing higher alimony payments is a laudable goal, but the extent to 
which the deduction/inclusion accomplishes this goal is unclear. Also, as I will 
discuss in further detail shortly, the same argument-indeed a more compelling 
argument--can be made with respect to child support payments and preglimo-
ny. 
paid to another are ignored for tax purposes (i.e., they are neither includable by the recipient 
nor deductible by the payor) .... Therefore, the amounts are taxed only once between the 
two. We could reason that the amounts should continue to be taxed only once, even though 
the family is no longer intact, because of the clear and direct relationship of the payments to 
the former legal relationship of the parties (or the continuing legal relationship, in the case of 
a paternity payment to support a child after a divorce or otherwise outside of marriage)." 
(footnote omitted)); Gerzog Shaller, supra note 130, at 324 n.l5; Laurie L. Malman, Unfi-
nished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363, 392 (1986) ("To 
the extent that family law continues the former spouses' economic unit through alimony 
payments, the tax laws should also treat the former spouses as a continuing, single tax unit 
after divorce."); Schenk, supra note 121, at 164 ("Although the marital relationship ends, the 
economic relationship does not and thus, the taxation of the earnings should not change."). 
146. See Geier, supra note 121, at 370. 
147. See id. at 396 ("[E]liminating income-shifting would discriminate between well-to-
do couples with income-producing property, who would effectively be able to continue to 
engage in income-shifting by transferring such property in satisfaction of support obliga-
tions, and less wealthy couples."). 
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Finally, the main theoretical rationale for the deduction/inclusion of alimo-
ny-that the tax treatment of alimony should extend the effective income shift-
ing accomplished through the joint return during marriage-is incoherent. The 
first problem is that it assumes marriage-based joint filing is justified. But even 
if we assume that a large enough number of spouses share income to a signifi-
cant extent148 and if we take this assumption as sufficient justification for joint 
filing, 149 the argument does not track when applied to alimony because alimo-
ny (though actually paid) rarely results in a fifty-fifty income split. We support 
and reward marriage not on the theory that spouses share some of their income 
(as unmarried taxpayers do quite frequently), but rather because we assume 
they share everything. 150 Marriage deserves special treatment, the argument 
goes, because when two people join their fates, society is better off. Marriage is 
worth supporting because it binds individuals into an economic partnership of 
equalsY Divorce does not end spouses' economic relationship, but it does 
change it quite explicitly away from the fifty-fifty presumption and toward an 
unequal model. If alimony replicated a community-property-style marriage,152 
148. But see Kornhauser, supra note 138, at 80 ("The theoretical justification for the 
joint return-the belief that married couples share resources-is largely unsupported by em-
pirical evidence."); id at 91 ("[N]either assertions of pooling nor nominal arrangement of 
assets in a pooling manner accurately reflect the reality of financial arrangements. Behind 
the facade of sharing is a deep-seated, though often subtle, control of the income by the 
earner spouse."). 
149. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 
1389, 1420-22 (1975); Zelenak, Marriage and Tax, supra note 138, at 353 ("If one accepts 
the premise that the crucial question in determining the appropriate taxable unit is 'Does this 
person pool his income with another person for the purpose of shared consumption (and sav-
ings)?' then requiring joint returns for married couples and separate returns for unmarried 
persons is an easy-to-administer rule that gets it right most of the time."). 
150. See Motro, A New "I Do," supra note 45, at 1541-42 & nn.108-09 (critiquing Hen-
ry Smith's proposal for partial income splitting in marriage based on individually determined 
ratios, Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 145, 
183 (1998) ). 
151. On the equality principle in marriage, see Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, 
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 91 (2004) ("People may engage in many 
joint enterprises where equality is not necessary. Joint owners in a business, for instance, 
may divide the ownership interest 70-30 without raising any alarm. But it would be perverse 
to conceive of a marriage of this sort, where one spouse has a recognized controlling interest 
in the property that partially constitutes the marriage, and, correspondingly, in marital deci-
sions .... Disparity in the control of marital property moves beyond simple inequality-
which an individual may rightly choose as a means to other ends-to subordination, which 
systematically denies the importance of whatever ends that individual chooses. As subordi-
nation in marriage is a threat to a spouse's basic personhood, the marital community must be 
bounded by a commitment to equality."). 
152. For persuasive arguments that it should, see Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and 
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1117 (1989) (proposing that divorcing couples be re-
quired to share income for a set period of time after the divorce); and Joan Williams, Is Co-
verture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2260-61 (1994) (ar-
guing for postdivorce income equalization for the duration of children's dependence plus one 
additional year for every two years of marriage beginning at the date of divorce). 
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the deduction/inclusion rule might make sense. Since it rarely does, extending 
the income shifting of marriage to alimony is indefensible. 153 Lots of taxpayers 
share some of their income on a regular basis. It is unclear why having been 
married should change the tax treatment of similarly personal transfers. 
Several scholars who have written about the current iteration of the rule al-
so believe that the taxation of postdivorce transfers is flawed in its disparate 
treatment of alimony and child support. 154 For one, the two types of payments 
are practically impossible to distinguish. 155 More importantly, the same exten-
sion-of-marriage argument for the deduction/inclusion of alimony holds with 
respect to child support.156 
In sum, the justifications for both marriage- and alimony-based benefits are 
weak, and yet these benefits are so firmly entrenched they are taken for granted 
as permanent aspects of the income tax system. 
Perhaps, however, there is another-subterranean, rarely articulated-
reason behind the current tax treatment of both alimony and marriage that helps 
explain these benefits' longevity. Perhaps the real reason we think married and 
divorced taxpayers deserve a special benefit is that we use marriage as a proxy 
not for economic unity, but for procreation. Perhaps marriage is a proxy for the 
153. Thus, the alimony rule is difficult to defend for reasons that are slightly different 
from the problem at the heart of marriage-based income splitting. Whereas marriage-based 
income splitting relies on the questionable presumption that most spouses share income 
equally, the alimony rule extends a benefit specifically limited to taxpayers who (presuma-
bly) share equally to taxpayers who explicitly share unequally. 
154. See Geier, supra note 121, at 432 ("[T]he parties should be given full power to de-
cide who, between them, should be taxed on all cash transfers incident to divorce."); id. at 
411-30; Gerzog Shaller, supra note 130, at 321 ("[T]here are public policy reasons to elimi-
nate the distinctions between them and to allow a limited credit for both types of pay-
ments."); Malman, supra note 145, at 379-80; Schenk, supra note 121, at 162 (proposing 
that child support and alimony should not be differentiated for federal tax purposes to elimi-
nate complexities resulting from the difficulty distinguishing the two); Waggoner, supra note 
144; Laura Bigler, Note, A Change Is Needed: The Taxation of Alimony and Child Support, 
48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 361, 361-62 (2000). 
155. This argument appears in almost every critique of the current system. 
156. The theoretical justification for the nondeductibility/exclusion of child support is 
that supporting one's child is inherently personal; the costs of raising a child are not deducti-
ble during marriage, nor should they be after divorce. The problem with this line of reason-
ing is that it ignores the fundamental difference between the nondeductibility of child raising 
costs by a married couple and the nondeductibility of child support by an ex-spouse. The 
former ensures that the underlying income is taxed to the couple rather than escaping taxa-
tion altogether; the latter determines that it is taxed to the payor rather than to the recipient. 
The alternative to nondeductibility of child support is deductibility coupled with inclusion to 
the recipient, which would be entirely consistent with the treatment of the costs of raising a 
child during marriage because joint filing during marriage accomplishes (approximately) the 
same thing as a deduction/inclusion postdivorce. Viewing the couple together, the deduction 
of child support wouldn't really be a deduction at all, but rather an income-shifting mechan-
ism. For a similar argument, see Geier, supra note 121, at 369-70, 431. 
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special type of dependency and identity transformation that tends to accompany 
the co-parenting relationship. 157 
Thus, we give married one-earner couples a benefit as compared with un-
married couples with the same income distribution because we imagine the 
married couple to be composed of a husband supporting the mother of his 
children. Even if he doesn't literally split his income with her, they are a unit in 
a sense that goes deeper than mere economics. He need not "assign" his income 
to her to legitimate the income-splitting tax result. To turn Holmes's metaphor 
on its head, taxing father and mother as one (i.e., as if each earned half of their 
combined income) does not effectively attribute the fruits "to a different tree 
from that on which they grew" because procreation turns two trees into one. In 
a sense what I'm suggesting is that we subconsciously retain some vestige of 
coverture, or some religious sensibility that husband and wife are "one flesh." 
This unity is most apparent during the gestational period-when the combina-
tion of both parents' genetic material is physically inside the expectant wife-
mother-but it extends to childbirth, and to the nursing period, and is also true 
as children grow. 
If the marriage dissolves and the man continues to support his former wife, 
again, we may treat these transfers in a special way because we imagine the 
former wife as a mother-the woman who carried, gave birth to, and who is 
caring for the man's children. This is not to say that alimony is really child 
support in disguise. Rather, quite apart from supporting one's child-paying for 
education, health care, housing-supporting a woman who is also the mother of 
one's child is in some sense supporting one's self. Transfers to her simply do 
not fit into any of the categories applicable to taxpayers who are not parents of 
the same child. They are not compensation paid to an employee, they are not 
157. I do not mean to suggest that policymakers have deliberately or consciously used 
marriage as a proxy for procreation. The existence of children is, of course, quite easy to de-
termine directly. But marriage may serve as a convenient and comfortable way for us to pri-
vilege "responsible procreation" without confronting the prevalence of nonmarital children. 
On the stigma associated with "irresponsible reproduction," see Linda C. McClain, "Irres-
ponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996). Marriage also expresses a view that 
all spouses, even elderly couples who have never had children, are potentially procreative, 
which those who see procreation as essential to the human experience may find comforting. 
As we saw in Part II.A, courts denying same-sex couples' right to marry have often re-
lied on the argument that the main purpose of marriage is to regulate accidental procreation. 
Another, related argument used in this context focuses not on accidental procreation specifi-
cally, but on the essential feature of marriage being procreation more generally. See Adams 
v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ("[T]he main justification in this age 
for societal recognition and protection of the institution of marriage is procreation, perpetua-
tion of the race."); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) ("The institution of 
marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of 
children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 
1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily be-
cause of societal values associated with the propagation of the human race."). 
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gifts arising out of detached generosity in the absence of any legal or moral ob-
ligation, and they are not charity. In a sense, they are not "transfers" at all. 
To be clear, I am not taking a position here on whether procreation does in 
fact justify the income-shifting benefits of marriage and alimony. I am simply 
suggesting that if this procreation hypothesis has merit (i.e., if the true reason 
we support marriage is because we use it as a proxy for the co-parenting rela-
tionship) the same treatment should extend to all transfers between unmarried 
co-parents generally and, most relevantly for our puifoses, to lovers who con-
ceive regardless of whether a child is ultimately born. 58 
Conception is a marriage of sorts. It is the union of two individuals' bodies 
to create a third potential life. While this potential life is in gestation, and 
whether or not it is in fact born, a man who supports the woman carrying it is 
different from a man supporting a stranger, a friend, or a sister. He is support-
ing a person-the woman-who is bearing his own flesh, including if the 
woman ultimately terminates the pregnancy. During the weeks or months of the 
pregnancy, man and woman are existentially bound. 
2. Utilitarian justifications 
Even if my procreation hypothesis is wrong (i.e., if marriage-based tax 
benefits are not our collective subconscious's way of supporting "responsible 
procreation") extending alimony treatment to preglimony makes sense for utili-
tarian reasons. First, the policy will encourage support for pregnant women. 159 
By setting a minimal baseline for acceptable support, the rule will also have 
positive expressive effects, shaming those who leave their pregnant lovers to 
fend for themselves. 160 Imagine Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 (and 
158. It also suggests that income-shifting benefits should not be automatically available 
to childless spouses and former spouses, but this issue is outside the scope of this Article. As 
I have argued elsewhere, I believe that joint filing should be limited to taxpayers who are 
legally committed to sharing income equally regardless of marital status. See Motro, A New 
"I Do," supra note 45. Taken together, this project and my former work recommend that 
childless couples be permitted to file jointly only if they are legally committed to sharing 
income and that co-parents be permitted to shift income through a deduction/inclusion me-
chanism so long as they are transferring more than a minimal threshold amount. 
159. Cf Bigler, supra note 154, at 379 (arguing for extending the deduction/inclusion 
treatment of alimony to child support payments in order to "encourage 'deadbeat dads' to 
pay their support obligations"). 
160. Some commentators may object that the tax code is the wrong vehicle for achiev-
ing this symbolic goal because it is the wrong vehicle for social engineering more broadly. 
This is not the place to revisit debates on the proper role of tax law in setting social norms. It 
is worth noting, however, that Congress routinely and deliberately uses the tax system to 
shape economic and social behavior. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incohe-
rence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REv. 685, 687 (2002) 
("[G)overnments generally (and Congress in particular), have frequently used both tax incen-
tives and disincentives in an effort to address important social problems."); Stanley S. Sur-
rey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with 
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 705, 705 (1970). Given that tax expend-
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TurboTax's corresponding prompts) modified to include preglimony as well as 
alimony. The appearance ofthe term alone (to be defined in the form's instruc-
tions as per the model statute below161) will link pregnancy with financial obli-
gation in the minds of taxpayers from the time they begin filing their taxes. 
Champions of marriage may, at first glance, worry that the pregnancy-
support deduction might undermine marriage by offering a "marriage-lite" al-
ternative, subsidizing out-of-wedlock childbearing. But the limited timeframe 
for deductibility means that in reality the revenue costs of the subsidy will be 
quite small. Furthermore, by "hooking" steady couples to the benefits of in-
come splitting, the deduction might create an additional incentive to marry. It 
may, in other words, function as a step towards marriage-instead of marriage 
lite, marriage with training wheels. 162 
On the flip side, this supposed benefit may, at first glance, figure as a nega-
tive aspect of the proposal in light of the ways in which marriage-based tax 
benefits exacerbate power imbalances along gendered lines. (For example, the 
current income tax system penalizes two-earner married couples whereas it pri-
vileges couples composed of one exclusive breadwinner. This creates an incen-
tive for the low, so-called "secondary" earner-usually the wife-to forgo paid 
work, eventually becoming entirely dependent on her husband.)163 Rather than 
chipping away at this problem, preglimony arguably extends it. Admittedly, 
this will be true in some cases. In others, however, preglimony benefits may 
help ill-suited partners forestall and ultimately avoid an unhappy marriage. 
More broadly, preglimony's promise is that it can expose the inherent contra-
dictions at the heart of a marriage-centered view of friendship, family, and 
community. Whereas marriage is an arbitrary eligibility criterion for special tax 
treatment, pregnancy presents a crystal clear limited moment during which a 
gendered view of men and women's different economic capabilities, needs, and 
deserts is appropriate. 164 Marriage is not special; pregnancy and nursing an in-
itures have grown from $45 billion in 1968 to $1 trillion for fiscal years 2001 to 2005, Stan-
ley Surrey's comments are as true today as they were when he first advocated a strong pre-
sumption against their use. For a discussion of the influence of tax law on gender relations in 
particular, see McCAFFERY, supra note Ill. 
161. See infra pp. 696-97. 
162. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR 
BEITER OR FOR WORSE? (2006) (using Scandinavian countries' experience with gay marriage 
to suggest that alternatives to traditional heterosexual marriage may bolster rather than un-
dermine the institution). 
163. See McCAFFERY, supra note Ill, at 19-23 (discussing the tax system's secondary-
earner bias); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1574 (1996) (examin-
ing "the possibility of valuing and taxing nonmarket labor in the same manner as market la-
bor"); see also Silbaugh, supra note 44, at 44-55 (1996) (surveying a variety of ways in 
which the tax system contributes to the law's failure to value unpaid work). 
164. Discussions with Laura Rosenbury and Adam Rosenzweig helped me in identify-
ing and thinking about this issue. 
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fant are. 165 By isolating the obvious, undeniable temporary dependency that 
comes along with procreation, preglimony can begin to strip away the imagined 
dependency that often follows women throughout their lives. 166 
Finally, over time the combination of these effects may create a more ro-
bust pregnancy-support norm that will influence sexual behavior. That is, if the 
government's preferential treatment of significant pregnancy support helps 
make it socially mandatory, the fear of such responsibility may incentivize men 
who do not want to become fathers to be more vigilant about birth control. 167 
C. How It Would Work 
The administrative mechanism for the pregnancy-support deduction would 
mirror that used in the alimony context, except that whereas alimony payments 
must be made pursuant to divorce or sefsaration, preglimony payments would 
have to be made to a pregnant woman. 1 8 Like in the alimony context, the de-
duction/inclusion treatment would be elective.169 Proof of the pregnancy or 
abortion from a health care provider would be required. This administrative 
burden on the taxpayers would create an incentive for pregnant women to seek 
medical care, a net positive. 170 (Thus, the pregnancy discovered through a 
165. For a related argument, see CRITIENDEN, supra note 54, at 268 (proposing that the 
birth or adoption of a child should tum spouses into full economic partners). 
166. See supra Part II.B. 
167. After conception occurs, it is unclear whether and how the deduction/inclusion of 
preglimony may influence the incidence of abortion. It would apply whether or not the preg-
nancy is taken to term, but if the existence of the tax benefit and its expressive effects causes 
men to support a pregnancy taken to term more robustly than they currently do such that the 
woman receives more in after-tax dollars, this may decrease abortions undertaken because of 
financial pressures. Cf Crowley, Jagannathan & Falchettore, supra note 32, at 22-23 (fmd-
ing that increased child support correlates with fewer abortions). 
168. See notes 181-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the payor 
must be the man with whom the woman conceived. 
169. Unlike in the alimony context, however, the default would be that preglimony 
payments are nondeductible to the payor and excludible by the recipient, because the deduc-
tion/inclusion alternative requires formal and deliberate cooperation, which will not always 
be possible. Additionally, women should be able to keep their pregnancy private if they wish 
to do so. For an argument that the default rule for alimony should also be nondeducti-
ble/excludible, see Waggoner, supra note 144, at 579. 
170. For a discussion of the risks to both woman and newborn child when a pregnant 
woman receives no prenatal care, see MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A HEALTHY START: BEGIN BEFORE BABY'S BORN, available at 
ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/mchb/prenatal.pdf ("Babies born to mothers who received no prenatal care 
are three times more likely to be born at low birth weight, and five times more likely to die, 
than those whose mothers received prenatal care."); and John L. Kiely & Michael D. Kogan, 
Prenatal Care, in FROM DATA TO ACTION: CDC's PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE FOR 
WOMEN, INFANTS, AND CHILDREN 105, 105 (1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
reproductivehealth/ProductsPubs/DatatoAction!pdf/rhow8.pdf ("Inadequate use of prenatal 
care has been associated with increased risks of low-birth-weight births, premature births, 
neonatal mortality, infant mortality, and maternal mortality." (citation omitted)). But see 
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home pregnancy-test kit that ends in spontaneous miscarriage would only be 
eligible for preglimony tax treatment if medical proof of the pregnancy were 
available.) 
Whereas alimony tax treatment requires that parties not live together, 171 
parties would be permitted to deduct/include preglimony regardless of whether 
they live together. In this respect, preglimony is qualitatively different from 
both alimony and palimony, which are triggered by the dissolution of a rela-
tionship. Preglimony is triggered by pregnancy. It may coincide with the end of 
a relationship, but it may take ~lace in the context of an intact relationship and 
it may solidify a relationship. 1 2 In a sense, preglimony might be seen as a term 
marriage of sorts-a time-bound commitment of mutual respect and of material 
support from the man to the woman. 173 
To take advantage of the deduction/inclusion rule, the payor and the preg-
nant recipient will need to cooperate. Both will need to retain documentary 
proof of the pregnancy and of the amount of the transfers, though an itemized 
record linking each transfer to particular costs would not be required. 174 The 
taxpayers will also need to coordinate so their respective deductions and inclu-
sions are consistent. To be recognized as alimony for tax purposes, payments 
must be made under a divorce or separation instrument (i.e., under a decree or 
written agreement). 175 Similarly, preglimony tax treatment would require par-
ties to agree in writing that payments represent pregnancy-related support and 
that they wish to designate them as deductible to the payor and includible to the 
Cassman v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 121, 129 (1994) (Taxpayers are not entitled to a de-
duction based on conception because, among other reasons, allowing a deduction would 
"create confusion because of the uncertainty regarding the date when a particular conception 
occurs .... A live birth [by contrast] ... results in the issuance of a birth certificate, which is 
a universally accepted and administratively efficient document of identification .... If the 
court held ... that the dependent exemption was available as of the date of conception, then 
the exemption would be available for pregnancies that never resulted in live births and the 
issuance of a birth certificate, including those pregnancies ending in miscarriages, induced 
abortions, and stillbirths. In the absence of any clear evidence of congressional intent to do 
otherwise, the court must spare taxpayers and the I.R.S. the administrative burden of estab-
lishing that such pregnancies occurred or did not occur."). 
171. See 26 U.S.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
172. Susan Appleton and Cheryl Block alerted me to the significance of these distinc-
tions. 
173. I am not suggesting a similarity to the term "marriage" in Islamic law, which con-
templates more robust obligations. See generally SHAHLA HAERI, LAw OF DESIRE: 
TEMPORARY MARRIAGE IN SHI'I IRAN (1989). 
174. For one, requiring itemization would be administratively burdensome. More im-
portantly, the physical, professional, and emotional effects of pregnancy are so diverse that 
parsing apart pregnancy-related expenses from other expenses would be nearly impossible. 
Finally, even if it were possible to draw such a distinction, since many of the burdens of 
pregnancy cannot be ameliorated, payments used toward non-pregnancy-related ends-
whether indulgences or investments for the future-should be given the same support and 
encouragement as payments used for strictly pregnancy-related ends. 
175. 26 u.s.c. § 7l(b)(2). 
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recipient. 176 While this imposes another administrative burden, again, it also 
creates a beneficial incentive; it encourages partners to communicate and reach 
agreement about their circumstances. 
One concern is that taxing women on the preglimony they receive could 
leave them with less support than they would have gotten under the current no 
deduction/no inclusion rule. This would happen in cases in which the deducti-
bility of preglimony does not incentivize a significantly higher payment. A 
simple deduction/inclusion rule would also reward even the most ungenerous 
contributions, sending the wrong message. To avoid this result, the deduction 
should be limited to payors whose pregnancy support exceeds a certain thre-
shold set so as to produce a reasonable after-tax award for the woman. One 
possibility is to extend deduction/inclusion treatment to any transfer to a preg-
nant woman that exceeds a standard dollar amount fixed for all pregnancies. 
Alternatively, the minimal threshold might vary depending on the length of the 
pregnancy. It might also depend on the payor and the recipient's economic cir-
cumstances. Finally, at the maximalist end of the spectrum, the rule could re-
quire that the man transfer enough of his yearly income to the woman so as to 
equalize their earnings. That is, only if lovers are prepared to share fifty-fifty, 
as if they were married in a community property state, should they be entitled 
to the income-shifting benefit. 177 
The modest revenue effects of the existing alimony rule178 suggest that the 
costs of even the most expensive version of the new rule would likely be small. 
Nevertheless, should the potential revenue impact of an unlimited deduction 
176. In order to reduce fraud or collusion, in addition to proof of the pregnancy, the 
payor and recipient might also be required to include with their return a cosigned statement 
recording their agreement and understanding of the tax consequences to each. I credit Wendy 
Gerzog for this suggestion. 
177. The advantage of this requirement is that it would encourage significant support. 
The disadvantage is that it would provide no incentive for those who are prepared to share 
significantly but not to the point of fifty-fifty division. It would also subject unmarried part-
ners to a higher sharing standard than we apply to spouses, an incongruous result. Finally, it 
would create a marriage penalty because the rate schedule for married taxpayers filing joint-
ly approximates but does not replicate "pure" income splitting. 
178. See Malman, supra note 145, at 398-99 ("Statistics indicate ... that the revenues at 
stake in the alimony deduction are not large. For example, only 0.6% of all returns filed 
claimed a deduction for alimony payments. In contrast, 48.3% of all returns filed took ad-
vantage of the joint return tables. Moreover, the potential for a significant revenue impact is 
more hypothetical than real. Although divorced women are generally in lower tax brackets 
than their male counterparts, studies indicate that cash awards to former spouses are relative-
ly few in number and small in size, and often remain uncollected. Even where substantial 
annual payments are made, the resulting increase in the recipient's income narrows the dif-
ference between the former spouses' marginal tax rates and thus lessens the revenue impact." 
(footnotes omitted)); see also Waggoner, supra note 144, at 579-80 (concluding that the rev-
enue loss following a reform extending the deduction/inclusion treatment of alimony to child 
support and lump sum payments is difficult to calculate but, regardless of the cost, in light of 
the dangers of the current rule to the custodial spouse and the children, "it may be an appro-
priate area for some federal revenue loss"). 
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rule prove to be a concern, a maximum cap on amounts eligible for deduc-
tion/inclusion treatment might be set. 179 Another reason for considering a cap 
is the possibility that if an unequal-earner unmarried couple splits income en-
tirely (i.e., if the payor shares enough to put both parties on equal footing) it 
would be in a better after-tax position than a married couple.180 
Finally, lawmakers will need to determine whether proof linking the preg-
limony payor with the recipient's pregnancy would be required. Requiring such 
proof would ensure that the benefit is narrowly tailored to apply only to unmar-
ried heterosexual lovers who conceive (as opposed to same-sex couples and 
other types of relationships that involve economic support). This would make 
the proposal more politically promising than its alternative. In an ideal world, 
however, a more expansive alternative is preferable. One reason is administra-
tive. Though in utero genetic testing is available, it is risky and expensive.181 
Thus, if proof linking the payor with the pregnancy were required, a couple 
wishing to avoid the risky test might have to forgo its preglimony benefits in-
itially and amend their returns once testing becomes safe (i.e., once the preg-
nancy ends in birth, abortion, or miscarriage ). 182 The test also creates addition-
al costs. This level of administrative hassle and added cost would make the 
program prohibitively complex and burdensome to many taxpayers. 
Another reason for not requiring that the payor prove a genetic connection 
to the pregnancy is equitable. Recent (albeit controversial) family law trends 
diminish the focus on blood ties for purposes of determining paternity in favor 
of more functional approaches. 183 We recognize that to be a parent, one need 
179. I credit Wendy Gerzog for this insight, though she would rather the cap apply only 
to the deduction, not the inclusion amount. 
180. This is because joint filing approximates but does not quite replicate pure income 
splitting. See Gerzog Shaller, supra note 130, at 328 (discussing the "divorce bonus"). To 
prevent the resulting "marriage penalty," the income-shifting benefit derived from the preg-
nancy-support deduction might be capped at the benefit that would have accrued to the 
couple were they married. 
181. See Paternity Testing, AM. PREGNANCY Ass'N, http://www.americanpregnancy 
.org/prenataltesting/paternitytesting.html (last updated Nov. 2007) ("Prenatal DNA testing 
done in conjunction with other prenatal testing involves some risk associated with how the 
testing is conducted, whether amniocentesis or CVS. These tests are often discouraged for 
the sole reason of seeking paternity because of the increased miscarriage risks."). The cost of 
paternity testing generally "range[s] from $400.00 to $2,000.00. Prenatal testing is often 
more costly than testing done after a baby is born because of the additional doctor and hos-
pital-related fees." /d. 
182. If, for example, the couple conceives in November of year 1 and miscarries in May 
of year 2, the support payments made in November and December of year 1 would not be 
taken into account in each partner's year l tax returns filed in April. Then, after the miscar-
riage, a test linking the man to the ill-fated pregnancy would enable them to amend their year 
1 returns to take advantage of the benefit-an administrative hassle that would effectively 
make the program impractical for most couples. 
183. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983) (holding that a biological fa-
ther's legal rights with respect to his child are contingent on whether he established a rela-
tionship with the child); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (plurali-
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not have a biological relationship with a child; likewise, to be a supportive 
partner to a pregnant woman, one need not be the person with whom she con-
ceived. Thus, ideally, a pregnant woman and her lesbian partner should be eli-
gible for the deduction, as should a woman and a man other than the one with 
whom she conceived. 184 But again, the more expansive the eligibility criteria 
the less likely the proposal is to be politically viable. Not requiring that the 
payor be the man with whom the woman conceived also broadens the targets of 
the reform beyond the main issue addressed in this Article-the relational con-
sequences of pregnancy. In any case, if no genetic link is required, to be consis-
tent with broader tax policy considerations aimed at preventing intrafamily in-
come shifting, 185 an exception would need to be made limiting the 
deduction/inclusion treatment to unrelated parties. 186 
The proposal would only benefit couples in which the payor's income is 
higher than the pregnant woman's and the value it bestows will increase as the 
rate differential between the two increases. Thus, the pregnancy-support deduc-
tion will not significantly help low-income taxpayers whose incomes are more 
likely to be comparable and whose rate differentials, if any, tend to be smaller. 
But as we have seen, calls for more robust public assistance for the unmarried 
poor have gone largely unheeded in favor of a model privatizing care for de-
pendents.187 The fact is that the world in which we live leaves many pregnant 
women to fend for themselves. Unless and until society steps in more robustly, 
incentivizing men to shoulder more of the burden is preferable to the status 
quo, and though it will only affect the well-off, its symbolic effects are likely to 
spread more broadly. 
ty opinion) (denying a biological father's paternity rights when the mother was married to 
another man when she gave birth because "a child born to a married woman living with her 
husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage"). 
184. Indeed, one possibility is to allow multiple people to shift income to a single preg-
nant woman, which would represent a step in the direction of recognizing broader collective 
responsibilities rather than focusing on the nuclear family as the main form of social insur-
ance. See supra Part II.B. The multiple-party version of the proposal would also accommo-
date polyamorous forms. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monoga-
my and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 284-85 (2004) 
(suggesting that the law should give greater attention and consideration to polyamorous al-
ternatives to marriage and monogamy). It is not, however, likely to attract broad support. 
185. See generally 3 BITIKER& LOKKEN,supra note 109, ~ 75.2. 
186. Thus payments from parents to their daughter would not be eligible for deduc-
tion/inclusion treatment. Payments formally characterized as transfers from parents to their 
son's girlfriend would also be ineligible as they would be viewed as gifts from parents to son 
followed by preglimony payments from the son to his girlfriend. The gifts to the son would 
be nondeductible and excludible (as all gifts are). The payments from the son would be eli-
gible for preglimony tax treatment but the benefit would most likely be lost (because if the 
son needs his parents to pay, his marginal rate is likely to be low, in which case no income-
shifting benefit would be available). 
187. See supra Part II.B. 
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In light of the fact that pregnancy's effects often extend over more than one 
year, the benefit might apply during the year of conception plus the subsequent 
year or tw~ither as a standard matter or depending on whether the pregnan-
cy was taken to term and whether the birth mother retained custody of the 
child. This may seem fair, but it would require distinguishing extended pregli-
mony from nondeductible child support, which, as we saw in the divorce con-
text, is practically impossible. In this sense, the preglimony debate may revive 
arguments for making child support deductible as well, which would be a posi-
tive development. More broadly, the long-term effects of pregnancy and child-
bearing raise an even thornier question: If the reason we support marriage 
through the tax code is as a proxy for procreation, why not create a motherhood 
or primary-caregiver support deduction as well as a pregnancy-support deduc-
tion?188 Again, like the issues discussed in Part II.B above, the answer to this 
question turns on how we as a society wish to treat unmarried parents more 
broadly, a subject that has been studied by other scholars. Regardless of these 
broader issues, however, recognizing and rewarding preglimony in isolation 
would be valuable in itself. The relational aspects of nonmarital pregnancies, 
which marriage enthusiasts and critics alike agree present opportunities for 
reform, have been largely ignored. I hope this project helps bring them out of 
the shadows and into the public debate. 
The provision I envision might be worded as follows: 
Pregnancy-Related Payments 
(a) General Rule.-Pregnancy-related payments, designated as 
such by both the payor and the transferee, shall be includible in the 
gross income of the recipient and deductible by the payor. 
(b) Pregnancy-Related Payments Defined-For purposes of this 
section, the term "pregnancy-related payments" means any payment in 
cash if-
(1) such payment is received by a pregnant person189 (as de-
fined in subsection (c)) within the later of [one year] ofthe start of 
the pregnancy or [one year] of the birth a child, and 
188. Elsewhere I have argued that joint filing should be limited to taxpayers who are le-
gally obligated to share their income, regardless of marital status. See Motro, A New "/Do," 
supra note 45. I continue to support this reform. In addition, I agree with critics who have 
argued that child support paid subsequent to a divorce should receive the same tax treatment 
as alimony. See supra note 154. 1 would also support extending this treatment to unmarried 
co-parents. 
189. The provision should be gender neutral to avoid uncertainties that might arise with 
respect to intersexual, transgendered, and other individuals whose sexual identity is ambi-
guous or subject to dispute. For a discussion of intersexuality and sex discrimination, see 
Julie A. Greenberg, Intersex and Intrasex Debates: Building Alliances to Challenge Sex Dis-
crimination, 12 CARDOzo J.L. & GENDER 99 (2005). 
March 2011] PREGLIMONY 
(2) the payment exceeds [dollar amount, percentage of payor's 
adjusted gross income, or other minimal threshold]. 
(c) Pregnant Person Defined.-For purposes of this section the 
term "pregnant person" means a person deemed to be pregnant by a 
physician in a licensed hospital (or in a medical care facility which is 
related to, or the equivalent of, a licensed hospital). 
CONCLUSION 
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Unmarried partners who conceive respond to pregnancy in a range of dif-
ferent ways. Some get married. Others face pregnancy and its repercussions-
whether it ends in abortion, miscarriage, or childbirth-together without marry-
ing. A third group views conception as the woman's private affair. 
The law effectively treats all sexual partners who are not married as falling 
into the third category; it treats all lovers as strangers. When pregnancy ends in 
abortion, it requires nothing of the man. When pregnancy progresses to term, 
the law requires male participation only in the bare essentials of bringing a 
child into the world. Its requirements fall short of the type of support that 
would be provided by a man who views the pregnancy itself-in addition to the 
potential child it creates-as a joint responsibility. 
This Article begins to bring the law up to date with this now commonplace 
sensibility. Pregnancy results from a connection between two people; its bur-
dens should be borne by both parties to the act. Translating this moral intuition 
into a comprehensive legal regime is complicated and controversial; it will take 
some time. But there is something we can begin to do now: the law can and 
should respect lovers who already regard conception as a joint responsibility by 
treating the economics of the pregnancy accordingly. The pregnancy-support 
deduction offers a first step in this direction. 
Preglimony is a new word; it is not a new practice. It's time the law no-
ticed. 
